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the ALTERNATIVE

The Politics of a Guaranteed Income?

Perspectives

Tom Charles Huston on The Nixon Monument

Leslie Lenkowksy on The Significance of FAP

Also in this Issue: Buchanan, Fuchs, Howe, and O'Rourke

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the ALTERNATIVE

to bare the witness and the truth

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☆The Continuing Crisis☆

●Deldon M. Hamann is dead. And goodwill champion, Leonard Moore, of Oakland, California is asking Americans to send him one million letters which he will take to the Russian people when he paddles across the Bering Strait on July 4 in his bathtub. It is unclear where in Oakland he receives his letters, but the odds are that he is pretty well-known both at the Oakland drunk tank and at the mental health association.

●According to West German officials, Martin Bormann has been found under Berlin's Invalidenstrasse Bridge where he has remained relatively inactive since 1945. And America's anxieties over a possible energy crisis eased a bit when Herman Feldmann informed the 165th national meeting of the American Chemical Society that enormous amounts of power repose in the common cow chip, which science will soon be able to metamorphose into pipeline gas." In a related development, Senator Edward Kennedy chose April 14 to make the dramatic proposal that the Senate establish a Bureau of Humanitarian and Social Services within the State Department. There were a few scattered har hars and a snore, otherwise his colleagues listened in dead silence.

●Women's Liberationists have turned to Tulsa, Oklahoma where Mrs. Nick Arevalos has developed a brave alternative to the traditional, patriarchal society. Not only has this courageous mother of two daughters and a son dealt effectively with her twenty-year-old son (whom police recently discovered locked in the same water closet Mrs. Arevalos consigned him to three years ago when he "missed the stool.") But she has also managed her husband well. Policeperson Budd Warren, who discovered Mrs. Arevalos' son when an extraordinary pungence drew him to the closet, reported that Mrs. Arevalos drove her husband to work blindfolded so that he would not look at women. (In Warren's disparaging words Mr. Arevalos is kind of meek.") The police officer discovered the younger Arevalos peacefully asleep in the same vertical position he had maintained for three years. Suggestive of how splendidly Mrs. Arevalos has mastered her situation, was the younger Arevalos' explanation that he never tried to escape from the closet because the matriarch "didn't want him to." The whole incident has caused a stir of optimism in the women's community which is now planning both a defense fund for Mrs. Arevalos and a campus speaking tour where her success should be stupendous.

● The month of April visited inclement weather throughout the country, causing some commentators to speculate that the

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Editorial

On Taking Slobs Seriously

One of the most furious passions pulsing through the Republic these days is the passion to be taken seriously. It afflicts the hominids of both sexes, all age groups, every walk of life, and every state in the Union. This craving for individual recognition and solemn appreciation emboldens America's most unlikely gnomes. Even the ant-like creatures crawling through the ruins of New York City seem to think that they are personages to be accorded the utmost seriousness, though they dwell complacently in an environment that would discommode Cro-Magnon Man, and they display no interest whatsoever in improving their plight and accepting the rudiments of civilization.

This hunger for deferential nods from one's fellows has not always agitated the American herd. In days of yore a slob was a slob. He was willing to admit his sorry insignificance, quietly trudge through his simple daily tasks, and when his hour was at hand he would croak . . . and so to dust. Bootblacks ministered to the hooves of their clients and did not deliver themselves of bursts of sidewalk metaphysics. Sales girls chattered about their sore feet, not the vulgarized political philosophy you are apt to hear from their modern equivalents. And it was held unimaginable that a newspaper editor would ever query the slob on the street about anything at all, much less take him seriously. This sober acceptance of the ordinary man's limited capacities and ultimate insignificance was not undemocratic or even disrespectful. Rather it merely recognized the resilient truth that a slob is a slob, possessed of no prowess or significance beyond his United States citizenship, the rights and privileges of the Constitution, and the love of his mother.

Indeed this pandemic condition of restrained self-esteem reached even into the White House. There is no record of any president ever having made the kind of grandiloquent quips about himself that are now the regular repertoire of Assistant President Henry Kissinger and many of the other White House Bellboys. President Coolidge imagined no timpani when he rolled out of bed in the morning — or in the early afternoon as was more often the case. And glamorous Franklin probably had less grandiose visions of himself while dining with Churchill and Stalin than our last three presidents have had while brushing their teeth. This was as it should have been.

But now Americans have loosed an egalitarian fever throughout the land, and they are all running around evangelizing the palpably untrue proposition that the carcass of the meanest man, woman, or child is very special stuff. Even more absurdly, they insist that everyone has his own exquisitely beautiful identity. "Rise up from the muck, and express your creativity," they exhort. Or, more desirable still, "Wallow around in it and utter any kind of gibberish that crosses your mind." For, according to the current wisdom, the coarsest expressions from the lowest slob are beautiful, and who is to say that Aristotle ever did any better.

Pure, high-grade bosh! And only the most gullible college professor would ever have given it a hearing were it not for years of beguiling chatter from psychiatrists, sociologists, and other such charlatans who dance for nickles and dimes before weekly meetings of dozing Rotarians and Kiwanians and the like. It is these moonshiners who have brought on the present witless chorus from the streets, these frauds and the gallimaufry of quacks who zoom around college campuses hypothesizing the splendors of the lumpenproletariat while pawing for wallets. They all make their livings by telling Americans how awesomely complicated they are and how their creative talents would quite transcend those of the masters if only a few adjustments were made in their environments. Bosh again!

The result of all of this tomfoolery is that today many trashy oafs are writing poetry when they could more profitably be shoveling dung. A lot of bird-brained college boys are dreaming about their appearances at Carnegie Hall and hunkering away from the gloomy day when they will have to fulfill their palmy fates and become life insurance salesmen. And a lot of arrant scoundrels are bashing skulls, pillaging, shooting their fellows, skyjacking, and otherwise making nuisances of themselves, all because they heard some charlatan pro claim that there is a Beethoven, a Balzac, or an H. Ross Perot struggling in the bosom of every rascal and every fiend.

So this urge to be taken seriously has its tragic side. No doubt it has issued in a good deal of criminality and sorrow. Hardly a week goes by that we do not hear of some crazed scoundrel shooting down a batch of defenseless citizens, or making off with valuable property, or commandeering public facilities, or shooting a political candidate. And on these occurrences do we ever hear the culprit admit, "I did it because I am an evil, vicious miscreant, warped from birth and so marked as evil until death. Free me and I'll do it again."? Not at all. Instead we hear a few incomprehensible grunts from the "accused," while a mob of apologists rushes out to proclaim the rascal's superior virtue and suffering circumstance. Then comes the villain's revised testimony. The great man had suffered grave indignities. He had not been accorded the high place in society that he knew to be his natural state. He was misunderstood and ignored. Girls thought him a screwball. He lost five hundred dollars at a rigged pin-ball arcade. His boss fired him for breaking paper plates. No one took the sainted chap seriously. The more irrational and bloodthirsty his act, the more he is glorified. His testimony is clean of the least spot of guilt or self-doubt. As his apologists see it, this contemporary Dillinger's world view is just as legitimate as that of any other citizen. Indeed it is often portrayed as no different than that of the businessman or any man of achievement.

Well, all these scoundrels should be gathered up with their apologists and put to the sword. Capital punishment should be reinstated. And it should be carried out during intermissions at professional athletic events. Let a gallows rise from every center field! Let the half time at the next Super Bowl feature the Manson Family, Sirhan Sirhan, James Earl Ray, and H. Rap Brown! Any charlatan who bellows about the elegant sensibilities of common criminals should be boiled in oil!

So this mania for taking people seriously has its tragic issue, but let us not forget that it also conduces to some gorgeous moments. All sorts of people, it seems, are just sitting around aching to be asked their views on this or that major subject. For instance, there are television shows in which famous faces sit around and jabber about anything that crowds into their tiny minds. Some of the things they say are merely embarrassing. Other pronouncements evoke guffaws. Taken together they reveal how astonishingly eager Americans are to deliver idiotic philippics or sonorous homilies on just about anything. Then too there are those ridiculous radio programs which encourage the country's fervent yahoos to call in and set things straight. But for me the most humorous of all these manifestations of the gab phenomenon are those idiotic newspaper columns wherein some semi-educated reporter queries a random assortment of shoppers about the most prudent course for the president to follow, say, at the next International Monetary

To Our Readers

As some of you noticed last summer. *The Alternative* does not publish during July, August, and September, for it is then that our staff withdraws to libraries and universities.

During this period we renew our contact with the great thoughts of our time, improve ourselves, and make ourselves better persons through telepathic communication with professors, students, and other suffering persons. This summer we intend to study at the University of California at Berkeley, where we have enrolled in G387: Goats and People, Expanding Civil Liberties; C999: The Choreography of Sunshine; S123: "Sexual Perversion" as a Force for Good; and L436: The Comic Book — Relevant to Shakespeare?

Obviously, when we send out our next issue in October, this famous intellectual journal should be better than ever or at least no worse. So be sure to get your change of address in now. Use the coupon on page 2.

Better yet, why not renew your subscription now? We might need bail money. See the coupon on page 18.

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Conference. The ensuing explications always tickle me and fuel my belief that man's closest relatives are not the primates but the hyenas. I have the suspicion that these interviews always take place in the purlieus of an insane asylum or of a large university. I devour them.

Now the serious problem with a nation whose citizens take themselves so seriously is not the episodic tragedies brought on by self-righteous scoundrels nor the degradation of rhetoric and the elevation of the thoughts of flatulent yahoos. Rather, the serious problem reposes in the certainty that when a nation's citizens take themselves seriously, the nation takes itself seriously. Government becomes grim business, unsympathetic with civil liberties or disagreement.

Americans have always been given to overdoing things. Today they are sodden in affluence. Many are besotted in anomie. Others are bored. Both boredom and spiritual anarchy can be power ful engines for catastrophe — especially amongst people who gorge their enthusiasms.

In the long view, though it entertains me vastly, I can see very little good coming from this passion for taking everyone so seriously. I can see little good in it, because it rests on an untrue proposition — the average man's view of complex problems is generally benighted, and rarely useful to any analysis. I can see little good in it, because it elevates the vulgar and drives out the civilized. I can see little good in it, because a nation zealously pursuing vulgar notions drifts toward the brutal. And . . . well, to shorten a long and increasingly obvious analysis . . . the demand to be taken seriously wafts very much of hubris. And if the Greeks knew nothing else, they knew their sins.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Paul H. Weaver
The Public Discourse

Toward a Political Science of Watergate

Everybody knows that old science fiction cliche, the Giant Amoeboid from Outer Space. A small meteor, or something, lands on Earth in a flash of flame and smoke. A scientist, or somebody (often a Teenager), goes to inspect the crater and brings back a small sample, which he deposits in his neighborhood laboratory. During the night the sample begins to grow; by morning it has become a huge, seething, repulsive Blob that sets out across the landscape, gobbling everything in sight and multiplying faster than a third-generation computer. It and its progeny get bigger and bigger; they invade the cities, wreaking destruction and death; tanks and rockets prove powerless to stop them; Civilization seems doomed. Then, in the nick of time, one of two things happens; a scientist comes up with an ingenious device or method for killing Blobs, and it works; or the Blobs suddenly die by themselves as a result of not being immune to the bacteria and suchlike of Earth. The movie ends, the lights go up, and everyone leaves the theater reassured that, as God is in Heaven, so is there a System on Earth, which, with the help of a few courageous individuals, will triumph over any dangers or evils visited upon it from an alien world.

Is this also the lesson of Watergate? Certainly there are some who have begun to insist that it is. The President said as much in his May 1 speech, which praised the press, the courts, a courageous judge," and the Congress. For its efforts, the *Washington Post* has already received an apology from the White House and a Pulitzer Prize from Columbia University. Increasing numbers of politicians have joined the chorus in praise of the System and in appreciation of its efficacy in responding to Watergate.

Now clearly there is much to be said for this view. There is a system, and it has by no means completely failed us in this case. Against considerable resistance, it identified and publicized a lot of intolerable behaviors; it has convicted several persons of crimes; it will almost certainly convict many more in the future; and there is reason to hope that the huge investigative, judicial, and legislative machinery that has been set in motion will eventually grind out the appropriate results with minimum damage to innocent persons and institutions. All this is unquestionably to the good. And to this extent, it is true that Watergate is already a success story. We should be aware of this fact, and let it cheer us up a bit over the coming months as the Ervin committee exhumes and reconstructs the whole sordid mess. It may not be much consolation, but it is something, and it should help us preserve an appropriate modicum of self-respect.

Yet there is an old proverb — or if there isn't, there ought to be — that warns: Beware the man who draws the moral of the story before the tale has come to an end; the tale" he is concerned about may well be his own. For the Watergate story is nowhere near its end. If I may be pardoned the metaphor, the Blob at this point has only just burst out of the laboratory and begun to ravage the landscape. Each day brings news of yet another person or institution being consumed. Thus far, brilliant defense lawyers, invocations of executive privilege, presidential speeches, and all the other weapons of political warfare haven't fazed it. The Blob goes forward, uncontrolled and perhaps uncontrollable. Nobody knows who will be next, or what it will all finally lead to. But it has already become clear that there is grave danger to all concerned. For the President, the Blob threatens impeachment. For Congress, it threatens the later political consequences of impeachment, which certainly include, as one possible scenario, intense popular backlash against the Democratic Congress, the election of a Republican in 1976, and God only knows what foreign or domestic chaos in the interim. Of course, it could turn out otherwise; nothing is certain. At this point, the only thing that can be said for sure is that the end is not yet in sight, that the stakes have become very high, and that the final outcome could cut either way, or both ways.

This is a situation which has made Democrats and Republicans, President and congressmen, join together in singing the praises of the System. They do so because this rhetoric, in addition to being partially true, is also extremely useful — useful to all of them collectively, and useful as well to each group separately.

It is useful to all of them collectively because it defines a strategy for regaining control over events by means of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The underlying idea here is that if you talk to the Blob as if it has already been done in by the System, you may thereby persuade it that this has in fact happened. If you succeed in this, the Blob may then start acting as if it *were* dead, or anyway moribund. In practical terms, this would mean that popular passions over Watergate would cool off, and that Congress and the courts wouldn't feel so constrained at each point to go yet one extra mile to punish yet one more person involved, directly or indirectly, actually or allegedly, in the entire repulsive mess. Of course, it isn't certain that this rhetorical strategy will work. The Blob may not listen, or may not believe what the System-praisers are saying. Or perhaps the Blob will prefer to listen to those in the press and elsewhere who are imploring it to roll on and on until every sinner in the land has been brought before the bar of justice and sent to his eternal reward. This latter is a particularly live possibility. Still, for those

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the ALTERNATIVE June-September 1973

Patrick J. Buchanan

A Question of Numbers

Accurate coverage of important events is the press' first responsiblity. Coverage which is exaggerated — either unintentionally through carelessness or intentionally through attempts to "make" news — cannot long be tolerated by an informed and deliberative public.

A classic example of media exaggeration was exposed by Edward Jay Epstein in a now famous New Yorker *essay published on February 13, 1971. Epstein, it seems, was provoked by the press' reaction to the December 4, 1969 death of Illinois Black Panther chairman Fred Hampton, who had been shot by police entering his headquarters with a search warrant for illegal weapons. Newstories (in AP, UPI,* The Washington Post, The New York Times, *the* San Francisco Examiner*), magazine articles (in* Newsweek, Life, The Nation, The New Republic, Newsday*), and assorted editorials and columns all reported that Hampton was the "twenty-eighth" Panther to have been killed by police, and most went on to suggest or deplore a "government conspiracy to exterminate the Black Panthers." What bothered Epstein was the complete lack of documentation for these "facts," and after months of arduous research, he came up with the real facts — which were quite different than had been supposed. "Twenty-eight," it appears, was an off-the-cuff figure given by Charles R. Garry, chief council and spokesman for the Black Panther Party, and this figure only days afterwards was cited in the press without source or qualification. No reporter had checked its veracity. Epstein asked for, and finally received, a list of twenty "genocide victims" from Garry. After investigating each case, Epstein discovered (a) that only ten of the twenty-eight were killed by police; the rest were killed (with plenty of witnesses near at hand) in burglaries, in shoot-outs with rival groups, and by other Black Panthers, (b) that of the ten, eight were killed in haphazard encounters (often ambushes) with police in the streets, and (c) that to report that police "intentionally planned" to kill Hampton and Clark is at best questionable. Epstein concludes that if there had been a Federal conspiracy to kill Black Panthers, "The implications would be so dreadful that one would surely expect the figures to be checked out with the utmost scruple." Clearly, they were not.*

In this article, Patrick Buchanan thinks it is high time to unravel another tangle of exaggerated news coverage. The question of amnesty for deserters and draft-dodgers is on many people's minds right now, and once again, as Buchanan points out, we are being deluged with voluptuous reportage which overdraws the facts and cripples the public's ability to make a sober judgment.

On December 14, 1971, introducing his "Amnesty Act of 1972," Senator Taft observed, " . . . estimates of the number of young Americans living in exile range as high as 70,000." Therein lies a tale.

Within 72 hours, Shana Alexander of CBS's *Spectrum* had checked Taft's highest estimate and found it low, and ascertained the motives of the entire runaway army. "*Over* 70,000 of these young men are now sitting in exile or in prison," she stated, "*because of their opposition to the war in Vietnam.*"

Clearly, the situation called for a manifesto. On January 1, 1972, sixteen worthies, anchored by the indefatigable Joe Rauh, issued a call for blanket amnesty: "There are at least 70,000 and some say as many as 100,000 young American men in Canada, men who have quit the military or refused the draft. . . We say: Let them go and let their records be made clean." The next morning in *The Los Angeles Times*, Max Lerner, a journalist of great probity, redeployed the 70,000-man army somewhat, declaring, "There are 15,000 exiles in Canada, some 55,000 in other countries."

By January 11, however, *The New York Times'* man in Ottawa, Jay Walz, had located the hordes. "As many as 40,000 exiles . . . are in Toronto, the favorite haven, and some 10,000 may be in Montreal," he stated, noting of their employment status, "Many others of the 50,000 to 70,000 draft resisters in Canada are not fortunate where jobs are concerned."

So it went through 1972 and throughout the U.S. media.

By early February of 1973, Fred Barnes of the *Washington Star* was declaring categorically, "There are about 60,000 to 100,000 draft evaders in exile from the United States"; and *Newsday* was announcing, in a lead editorial, "There are perhaps 100,000 young men who are in exile either because they fled the country to avoid the draft or because

Mrs. Eli Lilly, R.I.P.

A long and singularly admirable life came to an end recently when Mrs. Eli Lilly passed away at her home in Indianapolis. Mrs. Lilly was the wife of Mr. Eli Lilly, the distinguished Indiana industrialist who brought the Eli Lilly Company to world leadership in pharmaceuticals and other related industries.

Mrs. Lilly was known as a dignified and gracious woman whose reasoned belief in traditional American principles and whose serious intellectual and cultural interests moved her to support vigorously many cultural, intellectual, and religious activities, not only in Indiana but throughout the nation, often anonymously. So ceaseless was her support of these activities and so wise was she in choosing them that it is no extravagance to state that Mrs. Lilly has left an historic mark not only on Indiana but also on the nation.

Up to her very last days she worked for those principles in which she so ardently believed. She faced death gallantly. Her exemplary life was a lesson in how the good citizen should live. She will be missed by many thousands of people throughout the country who were helped by her, and who learned from her. She was an irreplaceable friend.

R.E.T.

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they deserted while in the military to avoid fighting in Vietnam."

What are the facts? Well, the fact is that the U.S. government places the figure of verified deserters and draft dodgers in Canada at just under 4,000. Outside Canada and the United States it estimates an additional 1,200. Of the 2,533 "deserters at large" outside the United States, the Pentagon places about 1,800 plus in Canada, while of the 2,400 "fugitives" from draft law indictments, the Selective Service places just under 2,000 with our neighbor to the North.

Official Canadian statistics do not contradict U.S. government estimates. Between 1960 and 1964, before Vietnam became an American war, roughly 1,300 U.S. males between the ages of 15 and 29 annually became "landed immigrants" in Canada. If one concedes that every single American male, over 14 and under 30 — above that annual average — who became a "landed immigrant" in Canada between January 1965 and January 1972 was either a draft dodger or a deserter — an obvious impossibility — even then the official total for all of Canada could have come to no more than 17,000 at the very time Mr. Walz located 40,000 in Toronto alone.

What about the "55,000 in other countries" friend Lerner was concerned with? Well, the second most popular sanctuary for the "over the hill" army has been Sweden. On that situation, Haynes Johnson of the *Washington Post* reported two weeks ago: "Sweden, generally believed to have the next (after Canada) largest number of American deserters or war resisters, does maintain an official count of deserters. A count made last fall said there were 602 deserters in Sweden." This squares with official U.S. figures. The military places 237 "deserters at large" in Sweden; the Selective Service puts there the "bulk" of the roughly 450 "fugitives" outside the United States and Canada.

To hell with the totals, we are told, the young men who fled to Canada and Sweden "rather than fight in this immoral war" are still, in Milton Viorst's phrase, "the guardians of the national conscience." Thanks to the statistic-mindedness of Mr. Palme's regime and the enterprise of the *New York Daily News*. we have an idea what the Stockholm crowd is up to when not guarding the national conscience. Quoting Swedish Director of Immigration, William Leth, last November Hugh Wyatt of the *News* wrote: "He (Leth) said that from 1967 to 1970, of the 585 Americans allowed to enter the country, 110 were involved in major crimes, citing the following: 36 thefts; seven robberies; 49 drug-related cases including pushing . . . Leth said that 52 deserters were jailed but declined to say how many are still there. Nearly thirty persons have been deported . . ."

That's quite a performance.

What Mr. Leth is telling us in a nice way is that in one three-year period, 20 percent of our Stockholm Brigade was involved in major crimes; 10 percent jailed, and 6 percent deported. Those statistics seem not only a trifle high for "guardians of the national conscience"; they would have been considered an embarrassment by Crazy Joe Gallo and the Brooklyn Mafia.

What do these statistics say? This, I think. First, 7,000 to 10,000 seems a more honest, justifiable estimate of the actual Canadian contingent of draft dodgers and deserters than the 70,000 to 100,000 we have been constantly fed. Secondly, that, because of an ideological bias, otherwise competent American newsmen have engaged in inexcusably sloppy journalism, swallowing whole without inspection bogus statistics fed them by Canadian based antiwar groups — when a few phone calls and a little arithmetic would have shown the number almost certainly outlandish. Third, that for two years some of the nation's principal news organizations have thus grossly misled the American people about the magnitude of the problem they confront in the matter of amnesty for runaways. Fourth, that some U.S. journalists and politicians have been characterizing as the "best of our younger generation" and the "guardians of the national conscience" a collection of draft dodgers and deserters whose statistical profile and performance in exile show them to contain more than the customary complement of malingerers, opportunists, criminals, and cowards.

This is especially manifest after watching the genuine heroes of our age and time debark at Clark Field. To hear the boys who ran away to Toronto and Montreal and Stockholm lionized as "moral heroes" is — obscene. □

Edwin Feulner, Jr.

A Minority Report Makes Good

Earl Landgrebe is a little known Republican congressman from the Second District of Indiana. He was first elected in 1968 to succeed Charlie Halleck, the former Minority Leader of the House.

As a small businessman who owned and operated his own truck line, Landgrebe came to the House without many of the silly misconceptions of so many new members of Congress. For example, Landgrebe is a "gut conservative" who believes that certain things are right and when they are right they are worth defending even if you are in a minority. This attitude gave him a number of problems back in Indiana, including a well-financed primary in 1972, where he almost became a political casualty to Indiana Republican feuding.

Nonetheless, he was re-elected by 54.7 percent of his constituents and was sworn in as a member of the Ninety-third Congress on January 3, 1973. He retained his committee assignments which included a ninth ranking out of sixteen among the Republicans on the lunatic Education and Labor Committee. The word "lunatic" here is used advisedly because of the madness which passes for normalcy in this body. Whether it is the Occupational Safety and Health Act which is driving hundreds of small businesses out of existence, the latest minimum wage proposal which has the primary effect of driving black teenagers out of productive employment, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which has done more to erode local autonomy and diversity in school systems than any other single piece of legislation, or any of the dozens of others, the word "lunatic" is used advisedly and appropriately.

Needless to say, Landgrebe's role as a fundamental conservative on Education and Labor placed him in a minority. The sensible people among the thirty-seven members of the committee never totaled more than twelve and on many issues could be reduced to five or six. Nonetheless, Landgrebe believed in his principles and, therefore, when the committee voted and then filed a report on the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 he not only voted against it but he also had the audacity to file a minority view of one on it. His views were his own because even such other conservative stalwarts as Messrs. Ashbrook of Ohio, Huber of Michigan, and Kemp of New York did not join him, and also because he had the good sense to file a substitute bill. The substitute would have cut back the funding level, kept the focus on vocational rehabilitation rather than medical treatment, consolidated the bureaucracy, and was within the President's budget limitations. Again, it should be noted that Landgrebe was the only member to offer an alternative bill at this point.

Then the battle of the budget began.

The President indicated that anything that came to him from the Congress that was over his budget would be subjected to a presidential veto. The Senate liberals, while usually preoccupied with grooming candidates for the next presidential election, nonetheless realized that if the battle of the budget were to be won, it would have to be won by an override of presidential vetoes and that this could most likely occur on politically popular and sensitive votes such as the Vocational Rehabilitation renewal.

Therefore, all the guns were pulled out when the President sent up his Vocational Rehabilitation veto message. Hubert Humphrey took to the floor on a frequent basis and with weeping and gnashing of teeth talking about how this program which had existed since 1920 was being eliminated and how thousands of people were going to be abandoned to a fate not readily determinable — since there were no fewer than five other competing Federal programs overlapping in the same areas and the Landgrebe alternative still provided

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for an increase in funding over the last fiscal year.

Lobbying pressure grew. The groups most directly affected had representatives in wheel chairs and wearing leg braces moving about the Capitol buttonholing legislators and engaging in a very intensive and emotional lobbying campaign.

The Landgrebe substitute was then noticed by a group of freshmen senators, when it became apparent that the Senate would be the testing ground of the President's veto. These young turks, led by Jesse Helms, (R.-North Carolina) introduced the Landgrebe substitute as their own bill on the Senate side and received wide backing for it. By taking key leadership roles, these members of the Senate were able to round up the necessary votes to sustain the President's veto in the Senate. The magnitude of this victory can be seen by the fact that when the President called Hugh Scott, the Senate Minority Leader, to congratulate him, the President is alleged to have admitted to Scott that the White House congressional liaison staff was so convinced that the veto would have to be upheld in the House rather than in the Senate that they had already written the congratulatory letters to the House members, and not to the senators.

The long-range implications of this vote and action by the Congress are truly remarkable. In the first place, the Senate, the body that unquestionably is more liberal with the taxpayers' money, upheld the first presidential veto of the current round of budget battles. From this the Nixon Administration has in fact begun a whole new direction in its domestic legislative programs. New, more rigorous criteria have been established for all of the programs. Furthermore, the liberal leadership in both the House and Senate found itself in total disarray and has to retrench, regroup, and rethink its position on the key question of budgetary priorities.

President Nixon, sometimes known for rhetoric, nonetheless has indicated that he intends to chart a new course in domestic policy which will require stricter evaluations and a generally leaner budget. That he is representative of the view of the vast majority of Americans cannot be questioned when one analyzes public opinion polls. And that he has won the first several battles is certainly clear from the words of even the Democratic leadership. Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, for example, admitted after the key Senate vote that "the President's in the driver's seat."

The point to be remembered when the battle of the budget of the 1970s is recorded for future generations is that it was a lonely voice from Valparaiso, Indiana, Earl Landgrebe, who had the courage to stand up for principle and to fight for what he believed in despite its apparent unpopularity. Landgrebe's action gave the United States Senate and the President himself the peg to hang their hat on in this opening round the 1973 battle of the budget. □

PERSPECTIVE: Tom Charles Huston

The Nixon Monument

In this month's edition of PERSPECTIVES we feature two differing images of the Family Assistance Plan, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the Nixon White House. Tom Charles Huston, who wrote the following essay, served as Associate Council to the President up until the summer of 1971.

I

Daniel P. Moynihan's chronicle* of the struggle for the mind of the President on the question of welfare reform is by far the most incisive analysis of the workings of the Nixon White House yet to be published. Yet, detailed and comprehensive as it is, the story is incomplete and, to a certain extent, misleading.

It is misleading because Moynihan contends that Richard Nixon's decision to recommend the Family Assistance Plan to Congress is evidence of the manner in which social science can make possible "fundamental" as opposed to "incremental" social change. His claim is not extravagant, it is merely that the availability of data which was far more reliable than it used to be provided decision makers in the Nixon White House with a rational basis for formulating governmental policy. The trouble with even this modest assertion is that in the course of the development of FAP there was no doubt "good" data available, but there weren't any demonstrably reliable answers to the critical questions that in most cases were and in other cases should have been asked about the problem of welfare. For example, Moynihan admits that no one knew why the welfare caseload rate was escalating or why welfare dependency appeared no longer to be linked to the availability of employment. Moreover, no one knew if work incentives actually worked or if the tripling of the income of half the people in a rural southern community would create social, economic, or political problems of a magnitude greater than those allegedly existing.

The type of "good data" Moynihan had available was certainly valuable for the purpose of determining whether existing programs were doing what they were intended to do. Assuming that at the time the Great Society programs were implemented there were clear objectives in mind, it was possible to some extent to determine quantitatively whether those objectives were being met. It was also possible to use this "good data" to determine the existence of new problems. In either event, however, value judgments were first required: governmental objectives are rarely defined in exclusively quantitative terms and problems are inevitably a decision that a particular condition is unacceptable to the moral or political perception of the decision maker.

Moynihan insists that the most important fact about welfare "is not what it costs those who provide it, but what it costs those who receive it." But how do you count that cost? Is it susceptible of calculation merely in terms of income, of years of schooling, of access to private baths? Moynihan most certainly thinks not. How, then, do we measure the cost? To attempt to do so in terms of the way in which the recipient views himself — a sort of Richter scale of self-respect — necessarily involves the way in which the tabulator believes the recipient *should* look at himself. Surely this is the basis of the gulf between those who adhere to the "work ethic" and those who regard such moralism as totally antiquated in our post-industrial society. I suspect the thing that riles the working man most about welfare is the suspicion that those on the receiving end simply don't believe that a person should have to work.

Good data, then, is like a good psychiatrist at a criminal trial: it should be on tap but not on top. Where public decisions are involved, ethics is a more important discipline than social science.

Moynihan's recounting of the politics of income maintenance is misleading on another account. He implies that Nixon's decision was largely the result of the influence of the social science findings made available for his review. It is difficult if not impossible for even a president's closest advisers to know what influences a presidential decision, but if there were no data to suggest that in 1969 we had a welfare problem or that a program of income maintenance might solve that problem, it is reasonable to assume Nixon would have chosen a less radical alternative. However, as Moynihan notes, Nixon was anxious for a bold domestic initiative; if it had not been in the area of welfare, it most certainly would have come on another issue. The President is a congenital grandstander, always anxious to please and constantly concerned about his place in history. Incrementalism goes against his political grain. He has a compulsion to seek to translate the most trivial event into a happening of historic proportions and his instinct for overstatement is a constant source of embarrassment to his political friends (recall his declaration that the landing on the moon was the greatest event in the history of mankind since the Creation). Nixon was ripe for a radical program that could be suitably packaged to pacify his conservative supporters, and to the credit of the man, only Moynihan had sense enough to recognize the fact.

Moynihan's estimate of his man was virtually flawless. Convince Nixon he

* *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* by Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

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was destined to be Disraeli and he assumed a British accent. But influencing the President proved to be easier than selling FAP, because the sales job had to be done on the President's terms rather than on Moynihan's.

For twenty-five years Nixon has gotten away with singing Dixie to the tune of the Battle Hymn of the Republic. Moynihan tried it and sounded like a fool. The problem was that he had to sell the most revolutionary social program ever proposed by a national administration as a conservative reform measure. Apparently Moynihan thought he could pull it off, but to his dismay he discovered that his coded signals were being intercepted by the enemy. It seems the only people who actually understood what Moynihan was trying to do were conservatives and southerners; the very folks who were supposed to believe all that stuff about getting people off welfare rolls and onto pay rolls. The blacks, religionists, and certified liberals distrusted Nixon enough to be suspicious of anything he proposed, and when Moynihan was forced to talk about "workfare" liberals, contrary to the game plan, they took him seriously. The reasons for liberal opposition were many, and Moynihan explains them with objectivity and perceptiveness. Nevertheless, one cannot help but feel that Moynihan tripped himself up by his desire to be one of the boys in the Nixon White House. As Watergate has demonstrated, you can't begin to compete with the professional Nixonites when it comes to deception.

Moynihan's story of the struggle over FAP is incomplete for reasons which are perfectly understandable. The author is too modest or discrete to relate all that he knows about the events in which he was the most significant participant, and he is writing on a subject and for the benefit of an audience that requires the author to display a conspicuous degree of intellectual detachment. Yet, the story of FAP is a story of the struggle for power in the White House and the story of the major if not the only policy debate in the Nixon Presidency in which differing views were pressed with vigor by men of ideas who understood that fundamental principles were at stake. For conservatives, it is the story of what went wrong and why, and for those of us who signed on with Nixon in the wake of the disaster of 1964 and entered the White House in January of 1969 believing that things were finally going to be set straight, it is a story of what it was like to have been present at Dunkirk.

II

January 21, 1969, at the White House was comparable to freshman orientation day at an eastern girls school: bright, scrubbed young faces wandering through the halls trying to figure out what in the world went on in all those rooms. Among the senior members of Richard Nixon's White House staff, only Moynihan, Dr. Arthur Burns, and Bryce Harlow had any appreciable experience in the Federal government.

Moynihan had held sub-cabinet positions in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations while Harlow safeguarded the corporate interests of Proctor & Gamble, and Burns directed the affairs of the National Bureau of Economic Research. As Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy Planning and Research, Moynihan initiated a study into family allowances, and he was a member of the White House task force that drafted the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965. He dabbled in New York City politics and returned briefly to academic life. For eight years, he was where the action was and his lines ran deep into the bowels of the Federal bureaucracy. When he came back to Washington in January of 1969, he was no stranger to the people or methods that made the government function.

Bryce Harlow during the Eisenhower Administration handled White House liaison with Congress and during the years of Nixon's exile had been the conduit through which the General maintained communication with his former Vice President. Nixon quite expectedly picked Harlow to be his chief lobbyist on the Hill, and had the man been given the support he deserved, the Administration's relations with Congress would never have deteriorated to the point that virtually every disagreement between the Executive and Congress portends a constitutional crisis. While identified within the staff as a man of conservative disposition, Harlow was above the battle: he was a technician who viewed his task simply as expediting the President's program on the Hill, regardless of what that program might be. To the great disappointment of conservative staffers, when he did come down on an issue, it was just as frequently on the liberal as on the conservative side. Largely it was a matter of what he thought could be sold to Congress, and considering the shattered state of conservatism in the ranks of Republicans in the House and Senate, there was rarely reason for Harlow to assume that the troops would balk at anything the President might propose.

Arthur Burns had also served in the Eisenhower Administration. As Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, he had pleaded with Ike to ease the money supply in order to enhance Nixon's chances against Kennedy, but the General refused and Nixon lost. In defeat, Nixon appeared grateful for what Burns had attempted to do. In the course of the debate over FAP one was forced to wonder whether he had since forgotten.

Moynihan's appointment to the White House staff as Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs was announced prior to the Inauguration, while Burns' appointment as Counsellor to the President came on January 23rd. As Counsellor, Burns had Cabinet rank and the press compared his position within the government to that of Minister Without Portfolio in a parliamentary cabinet. It was assumed, not least of all by Burns, that he was to be the White House staff member primarily responsible for domestic policy matters; the President had said as much in announcing his appointment.

As it turned out, the fate of the conservatives on the White House staff as well as the prospects for a moderately conservative administration were wrapped up with the fate of Arthur Burns. On paper, it looked promising. As a matter of political reality, it was something else. Burns was temperamentally incapable of the type of jungle warfare that was necessary to translate paper authority into substantive influence in any president's White House. In that occupied by Richard Nixon, it soon became obvious that he was a babe-in-the-woods. If Moynihan hadn't got him, Haldeman and Ehrlichman would have. In fact, I am convinced that Moynihan would have found the hunting vastly more difficult if Haldeman and Ehrlichman had not been so eager for reasons of their own to serve as gun carriers.

Moynihan attributes his victory over Burns to three factors: (1) his office was in the White House while that of Burns was located in the Executive Office Building next door; (2) as Director of the Urban Affairs Council, he controlled a fair amount of the President's time and that of his Cabinet; and (3) as a

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Democrat and newcomer, he was viewed by other members of the President's circle as less of a threat to their own power than Burns. Unquestionably each, particularly the latter two, was a factor (an office in the White House tends to be more important for impressing visitors than affording easier access to the President, but the image of proximity is as important in Washington as face in Saigon). More important, in my view, to Moynihan's success were his personality, his lines of communication within the bureaucracy, his extraordinary ability as an in-house advocate, and the competence and loyalty of his personal staff.

Moynihan is bold, witty, and charming, a delightful Irishman who wears his intellectualism lightly. Burns, on the other hand, is cautious, serious, and reserved, in many respects the stereotype of the Middle-European Jewish intellectual. To those whose intellectual tradition is rooted in the philosophy of J. Walter Thompson, Burns was a stuffy old man. To the President, one must conclude he was old hat; Nixon discards hats with wreckless abandon. Moynihan was new, fresh, entertaining; an exceptional representative of fashionable intellectualism. If he took the measure of those in the President's inner circle who won their spurs by dropping balloons in Los Angeles and Seattle, he kept his tongue and turned on the Irish charm. Burns kept his tongue, but a fool never felt comfortable in his presence.

Information is power to a presidential adviser, and of those close to Nixon, only Moynihan had free access to the vast reservoir of information available within the Federal establishment. In the course of his tenure in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, he made numerous contacts within the permanent government which were invaluable to him at the White House. His old friends and colleagues at the Labor Department were particularly helpful in providing the latest information, and only Moynihan among those at the White House recognized the value of the information that was so freely available from the Bureau of the Census. For the new-comers to Washington, there was never any assurance that information flowing up from the bureaucracy was reliable or even that all the relevant information was in fact flowing. Moynihan never had this problem. He knew who was in a position to give him what he needed; and when he needed it, he got it.

As an advocate at the presidential court, Moynihan is without peers. A masterful mobilizer of resources, he outwitted and outflanked his opposition on every front. As Director he controlled the agenda and proceedings of the Urban Affairs Council and, through his staff, the activities of the Council's nine committees. His allies were conveniently located in the senior planning staff of each of the Departments, so he had a new Cabinet member coming and going. His staff was unquestionably the most competent, man for man, of any in the White House: young, ideologically committed, and totally loyal to their boss (Dr. Burns could never understand how these UAC staff members could regard themselves as working for Moynihan rather than the President, but this merely indicated the degree to which Burns failed to comprehend the nature of the struggle). Steve Hess, Moynihan's deputy, was recognized in the White House as the most talented leaker in Washington; it was often remarked that UAC files were apparently being maintained in the newsroom of the *Washington Post*. John Price, a Ripon stalwart, served as staff director of the UAC committee on welfare and played a principal role in the committee's decision to recommend FAP, while Riponers Dick Bloomenthal and Chris Bemuth worked to salvage OEO and Model Cities. Personal, able,

and dedicated, these young aides were of considerable assistance to Moynihan in his determination to seize the initiative in domestic policy formulation.

Burns' staff was half the size of Moynihan's, and only Martin Anderson was involved on a day-to-day basis with the significant policy struggles being waged between the opposing camps. As bright and able as any young man in Washington, Anderson was handicapped by the reticence of Burns and by his own disposition to go-it-alone. I do not recall once during the months the Great Debate raged that Anderson sought the assistance of other conservative members of the White House staff. Moynihan, however, sought help wherever he could find it and recognized the value of the services a Leonard Garment or Ray Price could render on his behalf.

It is ironic that Moynihan should win the battle over FAP but lose the war over who should control the formulation of domestic policy. The President, however, abhors confrontations, most particularly those based on philosophical convictions. When it became obvious that Burns and Moynihan were at odds over the most significant of the President's domestic initiatives, he turned immediately to a mediator, Secretary of Labor George Shultz, to work out a compromise. Tactically, this was a victory for Moynihan, and all the players recognized it as such. Strategically, however, it was the beginning of the end. Shultz submitted his proposal for incorporating work incentives into FAP, and in the course of doing so proposed a further expansion of the program. Programmatically, this was perfectly acceptable to Moynihan, if not to Burns, but the fact that the President had turned to an arbitrator could only be read as a setback for both men. In a matter of months, Moynihan was stripped of his staff and operational responsibilities and kicked upstairs to Counsellor (the value of a title, however, depreciated as rapidly under Nixon as the dollar; in 1970 five persons held the superficially lofty rank of Counsellor to the President). Burns, in the meantime, had departed for the Federal Reserve Board. The winners were Shultz, who resigned as Secretary of Labor to become the first head of the Office of Management and Budget, and John Erhlichman, who became Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Erhlichman and his staff of young lawyers with little political experience and no disposition for principled decisions guaranteed that the President would never again be bothered by the inconvenience of a substantive in-house disagreement over matters of public policy.

Superficially, FAP even-handedly took its toll of conservative and liberal advocates of government by policy rather than press release, but as time demonstrated, the conservatives suffered most seriously. After all, Moynihan at least remained in place; Burns was gone and, with the sense of propriety that those who knew him expected, refused to be drawn into White House policy debates except to the extent that they related to matters within the scope of the FED's responsibilities, and only then to the extent that there was no misunderstanding about the independence of the Board. More importantly, however, Ehrlichman and his staff had no independent views on matters of public policy and no independent sources of information. To function at all, they were forced to rely upon the bureaucracy. Had John Ehrlichman been confronted with the charge that he proposed to inflict upon the country a new Spreenhamland, it is unlikely he would have bothered to rush to the dictionary, let alone to the historians. With the elevation of Ehrlichman, the initiative in policy formulation shifted to the senior careerists at HEW, Labor, and HUD; that is, to Moynihan's second team.

The demise of Moynihan was not, then, a rout for the liberals. They were still in the enviable position of having the initiative, and while their most able and articulate spokesman was no longer involved on a daily basis in the formulation of the full range of domestic policies, he could nevertheless weigh in directly with the President on matters of urgency, as, for example, he did repeatedly on issues relating to education.

For conservatives it was another story altogether. Martin Anderson joined Ehrlichman's staff where he promptly withered. Roger Freeman, a man of singular distinction and ability brought into the White House by Burns, lasted barely six months after his mentor's departure. By June of 1971, it was possible to identify three full-time members of the White House staff who were professed conservatives, none of whom had

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the remotest influence on the formulation of domestic policy. In the Nixon White House it was damn tough for a man of ideas to survive; for a man of conservative ideas and a modest dose of self-respect, it was virtually impossible.

Of those who made an effort to stop FAP, only Burns, Anderson, and Vice President Agnew were insiders, and only Anderson could reasonably be identified with the organized conservative movement. Those with valid credentials as conservative activists were removed from, if not above, the battle. In the most significant struggle to occur in the Nixon Administration, the White House conservatives were at least useless; most likely they were a liability.

It was Arthur Burns' conviction that the first duty of a member of the White House staff was loyalty to the President. To publicly suggest disagreement with the President's policies, to go outside the chain of command in an effort to influence presidential policy, to resort to deception, guile, or flattery, to do anything other than make a straightforward presentation of the facts upon which a presidential decision could be based was, in Burns' view, an act of disloyalty to the President. The only criticism I ever heard him make of Moynihan or his staff in the course of the Great Debate was that they were leaking — or so it appeared to him — information to the press in an effort to build up pressure on the President and compromise those who were opposed to FAP.

It is difficult as a matter of theory to quarrel with Burns, but as a practical matter it was naive to assume that such guidelines were anything other than a masterplan for defeat. Moynihan knew as Burns did not that policymakers are moved by many things and least of all by cold facts.

Whether for reasons such as those which influenced Burns, or otherwise, the conservatives in the White House failed in any significant way to make effective use of the resources potentially available to them when FAP was under consideration by the Executive and later when it was pending in Congress. It was the conservatives on the outside who saved the day — *Human Events* and the American Conservative Union, particularly — by waging a fight that at the outset seemed inevitably doomed to failure.

When I would express my discouragement at the lack of influence we conservatives had on the course of events at the White House, a colleague would assure me that we occasionally won a battle and thereby justified our presence. In retrospect, however, it seems to me that the lesson is not to be found in the fact that we lost such a disproportionate number of battles, but that by our presence we made it more difficult for conservatives on the outside to win those that most needed winning. If we were not used, we were at least had — and most conspicuously by ourselves. □

PERSPECTIVE: Leslie Lenkowsky

The Significance of FAP

In this month's edition of PERSPECTIVES we feature two differing images of the Family Assistance Plan, the Nixon White House, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Moynihan's book, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income *(Random House, $10.00). Leslie Lenkowsky, who wrote the following essay, is completing his doctoral thesis on welfare at Harvard University.*

Any scholar who writes about recent history inevitably risks nearsightedness. Does the meaning of events in eighteenth century Britain seem so much clearer not least because we have lost track of so much of what actually occurred? When contemporary issues are also fraught with ideological and political controversy, the perils of scholarship are enhanced. The unsuspecting author might quickly find himself accused not just of missing the forest for all those trees, but also of overlooking many of the trees.

In *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income*, Daniel P. Moynihan undertook to write about events which were not only controversial but also still front-page news while the manuscript was at the presses. In a televised address on August 8, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), a bold scheme to reform a welfare system characterized with striking unanimity as a "mess." A member of the President's cabinet, Dr. Moynihan was one of the key figures in the events leading to the proposal of FAP and had a favorable position for following its course in the Congress; his new book offers a participant's account of what occurred. It is the first major study of policy-making in the Nixon White House by an "insider" and will undoubtedly provide much material for future students of the period. That some may find it less than fully comprehensive is surely more a tribute to the complexity of public life than a criticism of a serious book nearly six hundred pages in length.

The work of a senior professor of government at Harvard, and an acknowledged man of letters, is not, however, to be judged solely by its ability to record daily events. Part of the interest aroused by the presidential message stemmed from the perception that FAP was a landmark in social policy, "historical legislation" as *The Economist* put it. *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* attempts to explain why a conservative president came to make such a proposal the most important item in his agenda for domestic policy; it also tries to assess why Congress — and especially the liberal Senate — did not. This objective guides the interpretive framework of the book, affecting in the usual ways the selection and emphasis of events in the narrative. Professor Moynihan has never been one to leave such judgments understated and regardless of their overall assessment of the book, virtually all readers will take issue with one or another, or all, of the conclusions he draws.

Yet the book also has another level of meaning which is a central concern not only in this but in much of Professor Moynihan's work. It is asserted most clearly on the first page: "An account of the history of the Family Assistance Plan . . . must hence be one of failure. The law was not enacted . . . Yet in an only slightly different perspective the notion of failure would appear inappropriate." And repeated at the beginning of the last chapter: "For those concerned to see the national government assume an innovative and responsible role in the resolution of social conflict and inequity, the history of Family Assistance provides grounds for optimism." Notwithstanding his own vigorous advocacy of its passage, for the author, FAP, even in defeat, is still a kind of success.

Those acquainted with some of Professor Moynihan's writings while he was in the White House may perceive this conclusion as another effort by a public servant to look at the benign side of an otherwise regrettable situation. Others will wonder what all the celebration is about: was not FAP really a rather pedestrian idea, or alternatively, an irresponsible one? To still more people, its proposal (or its defeat) typifies the frustrations of American politics: why does the system always either defeat good ideas, or fail to produce them? None of these questions is without merit, but all betray an inadequate appreciation of the significance of the Family Assistance Plan and the lessons to be drawn from its history.

Perhaps it is best to point out what FAP, in fact, was not. Most of all, it was not *the* guaranteed income which, as the President stated in his 1969 message, would have assured a minimum income "regardless of how much (a person) was capable of earning, regardless of what his need was, regardless of whether or not he was willing to work." Nor was it another episode in the long history of bureaucratic tinkering with the existing welfare system. Finally, FAP was not simply an extension of the administrative approach to welfare dependency, which seeks to reduce the number of recipients through a combination of social services, manpower programs, and inducements to work. Yet FAP was also a little of each.

Central to the Nixon Administration's approach to welfare was the understanding that *a* guaranteed income already exists. It provides cash, frequently in large amounts, only to se-

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ected categories of individuals — the disabled, the blind, the aged, and mothers, or unemployed fathers with dependent children. It does this in a way that permits inequalities in benefits for equally needy recipients. Its administration is chaotic, lending itself to abuse by both client and official. And although no one knew for sure, a system intended to be generous and compassionate may have had quite the opposite effect. "It breaks up homes," said the President. "It often penalizes work. It robs recipients of dignity. And it grows.

The Administration proposed to abolish this type of guaranteed income and replace it with one that would promote what it judged to be more desirable objectives. FAP would have provided a nationwide floor under the income of all families with children, thereby making financial need the basic criterion for public assistance and reducing disparities among levels of payments. It included provisions to insure that all recipients would be treated alike — for example by specifying which of them are to be referred for job-training or other services. By the same token, through a combination of work requirements, penalities, and incentives, the Administration sought to insure that only those who truly lacked resources would fully benefit. (During the three years that FAP was before the Congress, the Administration continued to strengthen these provisions.) And while FAP would cost more in the short-run than the existing system, and extend Federal assistance to more people, it was designed, in the President's words, "to correct the condition (welfare) deals with and thus to lessen the long-range burden and cost." This, then, was a guaranteed income designed to stabilize an activity of government which had seemed beyond control.

It was in these terms that the President understood Family Assistance, proposed it, and continues to support it. (As recently as March 2, President Nixon reaffirmed his belief that FAP was "the best solution to . . . the welfare mess.") Beyond the technical sophistication essential for its proposal, the significance of FAP as a policy lies in its fusion of this conservative interest in social stability with the liberal concern for social meliorism. Neither of these terms is precise, but their meanings are understood. In its original version, FAP plus food stamps would have provided roughly half of the amount which Americans living in families with incomes below the official poverty line needed to move above it. The impact of the proposal would have been pronounced in poorer regions of the country, particularly the states of the deep South; as a result of the President's initiative, wrote a *Fortune* reporter, there was a "looming money revolution" in the small towns of Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, and elsewhere. Yet what sort of an upheaval originates in a plan to stem the threat of growing welfare dependency to the social order?

To conclude that FAP must have been poorly conceived or reflected the temporary ascendance of a leftish palace clique would be mistaken. The debate that preceded the President's August message had engendered, in Professor Moynihan's words, "a relatively genuine, cooperative solution." If liberal reform might be said to have exhausted itself by the end of the sixties, then conservative social policy, it could fairly be argued, hardly existed, at least not in the form of ideas tested in practice. The Nixon Administration recognized this. At a time when staleness in policy seemed as probable as stalemate in politics, the advent of Family Assistance revealed an imaginative new direction, one that was neither liberal nor conservative, but nonetheless purposeful. For that reason its very proposal was no small achievement.

As Professor Moynihan documents in considerable detail, however, it was precisely its lack of a well-established identity that plagued Family Assistance throughout its three years on Capitol Hill. Was it a conservative program of welfare reform or a liberal one of income redistribution? It was, of course, both. But once the issue was entered

on those terms, Family Assistance was lost, for it could be readily shown that FAP could never offer enough of either.

Although some members of the Administration, such as the Vice President, foresaw this difficulty, it did not arise immediately, largely due to the personnel and institutional arrangements of the House of Representatives. There, as in the White House, decision making was effectively centralized in a body that possessed both the technical and political competence to deal with a new proposal like FAP, the Committee on Ways and Means. Under the guidance of Chairman Wilbur Mills and the senior Republican, John Byrnes, the Committee assessed, modified, but ultimately supported Family Assistance, agreeing with the Administration that it was not just the best but essentially the only real alternative to the existing system. Twice the rest of the House of Representatives agreed, passing FAP by comfortable margins.

In the Senate, however, legislative consideration essentially began anew. Part of the problem was simply conceptual: FAP was hard to understand and the Administration's early testimony was not especially helpful. But more than that was involved. Neither those interested in reducing welfare rolls nor those concerned with increasing the incomes of the poor felt that the House-passed bill was acceptable. Compounding this was the dominance on the Senate Finance Committee (which handled the legislation) of those who represented areas where Family Assistance would have the most profound — and most uncertain — effects. If the states of the deep South stood to gain immensely from FAP, they were also the ones whose economies would be most exposed to any disruptions in the labor market that the plan might prompt. These were real concerns of serious people, but lacking was the imagination, and perhaps after a time, the desire, to appreciate how Family Assistance responded to them.

Before the end of the Ninety-second Congress, major new legislation for both welfare reform and income maintenance, chiefly favoring the elderly, had been enacted. But disagreement on the new direction set out by the President persisted in the Senate up to adjournment. The issue was always close: even in the final days a motion which would have cleared the way for a Senate vote on FAP failed, forty-one to forty-four. The overriding consideration was still, as Professor Moynihan had written about the Ninety-first Congress, that "Lined up, the left and the right had, on this issue and at this time, a capacity to punish that made silence a rational response." Election-year politics complicated matters, but did not fundamentally change the fact that Family Assistance had few strong friends and many vocal opponents.

Nonetheless, many of the objectives outlined in the President's message were achieved. The Social Security Amendments of 1972, passed in October, place a Federal floor under the incomes of the aged, disabled, and blind. Earlier in the year, many of the "workfare" provisions of FAP were enacted as an amendment to another bill. With the extension of the food-stamp program to over twelve million recipients, including many of the "working poor," one of the disparities between those eligible and those ineligible for public assistance has been diminshed. Throughout the country, welfare rolls have stopped growing and are even decreasing in places, quite possibly assisted by improvements in administrative practices. Not least of all general revenue-sharing, an intellectual companion-piece to FAP, was enacted by the Ninety-second Congress. It will provide the first practical test of the Administration's new strategy for social policy.

While these accomplishments are of little solace to the millions of people whose lives may have been immeasurably improved had FAP passed, perhaps it is the case that such a fundamental change requires an exceptional degree of support, which few in politics can afford to provide for long. Even so, a proposal for major change came close enough to passing that many of those involved will continue to think —

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and write — about the one or two things they might have done differently. Moreover, the events of the last three years have established Family Assistance as an item on the national agenda. Ironically, having failed for seeming too large, it may someday pass for seeming so small.

Welcome though it might be, it would almost be unfortunate if Family Assistance were enacted in that fashion. Beyond its substantive content, FAP also had a symbolic aspect: it was a grand idea, a "first long step," said the President, "in the great task of our people," the elimination of poverty and dependency. In truth, it was not a *first* step. Other administrations had addressed themselves to the same ends with as much hope and energy. But by the beginning of 1969, the consequences of these efforts were so dispiriting as to call into question the ability of government itself. That FAP was not enacted is probably less important than that its history reveals its potential to have been enacted. This may be its enduring significance and why, to the author of *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income*, it can be considered a success. □



A Better Example of Washington Humor

Well, the Greatest Show On Earth reconvened in January and once again Washington is agog and atwitter over the performances of some of Congress' leading men. Of the incoming congressional crop, Senator James Abourezk (D-S.D.) promises to provide the most drama. In less than a month the pride of Rapid City had violated Senate protocol, become the subject of a riddle, tilted at enough windmills to last most men a full six-year term, and established himself as a new darling of the radical chic crowd.

Congress had barely convened when Abourezk (Ah'-bor-esk) broke the hallowed rule that freshmen should be seen and not heard. It is a long-standing tradition that freshmen must first put in a period of apprenticeship and homework-doing before daring to make their maiden speech. This custom is best illustrated by the now-famous story concerning the late Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma and a nameless freshman senator. Kerr, a leader of the Senate's inner circle for years, was making some notes at his desk when approached by the freshman, who intended to introduce himself and, hopefully, to make a few ingratiating remarks. After introductions were made, the young legislator told Senator Kerr of his deep respect and admiration for him. Kerr nodded a perfunctory acknowledgment of this flattery and went back to his notes. The freshman, hoping to brighten up the conversation, observed that Senator Kerr must have seen many changes in the Senate during his distinguished years of service — to which Kerr briefly nodded his assent. Thinking to draw out some witty or charming stories on the subject, the freshman asked Kerr to favor him with some observations on the particular changes he had seen. Without either looking up from his work or pausing a second, Kerr is reputed to have pointedly replied "Freshmen didn't used to be so talkative."

Abourezk had little time for such niceties however, as he noted in his maiden speech, and proceeded to unburden himself of some memorable political truths. He accused Richard Nixon of dictatorially conducting "foreign wars, both public and secret, of his own volition," of making "this Nation into the bully of the world," and of "moving us precipitously close to an authoritarian system." He concluded that Congress must retaliate by cutting off funds for the White House staff and for high executive branch officials, and pledged himself to "re-creating a viable democracy." Abourezk wasn't exactly swamped with praise for the speech — in fact, it was greeted with near complete silence. Only his equally courageous mentor, George McGovern, heartily congratulated him, noting, with his usual brilliant political insight, that if Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, Robert La Follette, or Robert Taft were alive they would rush to Abourezk's side in the struggle.

Showing the political prescience of his mentor, Abourezk led the fight against Nixon's "one man rule" by spearheading the opposition to Nixon's cabinet appointees. The high spot of the battle came when Elliot Richardson was to be confirmed as Defense (ugh!) Secretary. The Senate roll call began with Abourezk, who bravely and firmly cast his nay vote, only to be swamped by a sea of eighty-one ayes. The final tally: 81 to 1. Of his ordeal, Abourezk noted "I started to get a sinking feeling about the time they passed Hughes, McGovern, Nelson and Mondale." Bella Abzug, watch out.

Abourezk seemed to relent in his fight to restore (in his own words) a "profoundly conservative" form of government when he voted to confirm Nixon-nominee James Schlesinger, Jr. as head of the CIA. He cleared himself, however, in the eyes of his followers by explaining his vote: "I didn't want my office bugged."

For his exploits Abourezk has been rewarded with one of Washington's most highly prized commodities: he has become the object of a riddle. Anybody who is anybody must be certified by various capital wits, who use their keen satiric sense and rapier-sharp intellects to hone such gems as the following (which is one of the better examples of Washington humor). Question: When is a middle-aged Lebanese a young Turk? Answer: When he's James Abourezk. I repeat: one of the better examples of Washington humor.

In addition to their new pleasure of Abourezk-watching, Capitol Hillologists have been cheered by Senator Vance Hartke's (D-Ind.) return to the political wars. You may remember the Senator's brief campaign for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination, during which he courageously decided to speak out on the central issue of American political life, which until then was being ducked by the other campaigners. Unfortunately, an unusually large number of the good people of New Hampshire and Florida failed to recognize that free false teeth for old folks was in fact the central issue of American political life. Consequently the Senator finished just behind Sam Yorty and Wilbur Mills in the New Hampshire primary, garnering 2.7 percent of the vote. The New Hampshire setback sapped some of the momentum from the Hartke juggernaut, and he finished tenth in the Florida primary, with three-tenths of a percent of the popular vote. Although in the Florida contest he again finished behind Wilbur Mills, it is reliably reported that his finish ahead of Mayor Yorty (.2 percent of the vote) propelled him into serious contention (one of the top five candidates) for the vice-presidential spot should Shirley Chisholm have captured the Democratic presidential nomination.

The Hoosier solon has never been one to retire and quietly lick his wounds, however; so with characteristic zeal he bounced back again, bringing yet another vital issue before the court of public opinion. This time the subject was antihijacking searches at airports, and Hartke was agin 'em. He repeatedly refused to undergo searches by airline security personnel before air flights, and attempted to alert the American people to this new and growing menace.

In a speech purportedly about international trade, the silver-tongued sage waxed eloquent on the subject of airport neofascism. His address is fascinating and should be examined by students of either rhetoric or politics. Opening with a discussion of his modesty, he noted, according to the official text, that Hartke is

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an independent thinker" who "stands ere, alone. . .with less than a care for ie villification (sic) program" against im. Expanding on this courage motif, e declared "I am badgered at airports t this moment because I do exactly as iany other members of Congress do. . . isist on immunity of movement to and om the House and Senate — on grounds f Constitution (sic) *Law*, not on a point f *personal* privilege or arrogance. — that am advised repeatedly how unpolitical I am to claim absolute immunity *without* shieled (sic) laws for news men, unpolitic to observe, and demand observance of respect and official courtesy for the office I hold under the Constitution and particularly its First Article." He discussed the "kitty of more than one million dollars to 'get Hartke' " which he claims has been raised by business, but went on "I say, with Tonto, my faithful Indian guide, they are going to have to find the silver bullet — maybe they have one."

Varying the courage theme slightly, he discussed his suffering at the hands of the airline Gestapo: "When he is searched at airports because he is investigating a horrendously malfunctioning agency of the federal government, he does not expect to be felt over with a cattle prod at airports."

More ominous still is the conspiracy between the press and airline officials. The Senator states that "a young reporter at an airport asked me: 'Who do you

Eleven Years of Peace

When I went to interview Dr. K of the ICCS he was bustling around his office, emptying his desk, and burning his papers in the center of the floor. I asked him what was going on; his answer was lost in a round of mortar fire.

Dr. K picked himself off the floor and set back to work. "The ICCS is pulling out."

"Is that official?"

"No" — A rocket exploded directly overhead — "but it's in the air."

I brushed the plaster off my pad and tried to get on with my interview.

"Dr. K, how long have you been a Vietnam expert?"

"I've been on the International Commission of Control and Supervision since 1973; before that I was a full professor at Harvard — so I've really been a expert for quite some time!"

"How were the members of this Commission picked?"

"We were all chosen from neutral nations — Cuba, Bulgaria, Tibet, or Massachusetts. Naturally, the Saigon people raised hell — dead set against Massachusetts — but we persuaded them of our good faith."

"What was the Commission supposed to do?"

Dr. K bristled. "Are you implying that we've failed?"

"No! Certainly not!" I danced away from a falling beam. "I merely meant — "

"Because if you are," he continued, "I won't have it! We're a proud group! A proud group!" Dr. K added his identification papers to the pyre and thrust a Russian phrase book in his back pocket. "Our duties are to police the entire area of South Vietnam and to prevent all military infiltration."

"And how many men do you have for this purpose?"

"Fourteen. Hanoi originally wanted nine, but the Americans persuaded them to accept a stronger force."

"How?"

"Six months of delicate negotiations and 8000 tons of bombs in Haiphong harbor — do you want some back issues of *The Nation*?" I demurred; he shrugged and added them to the blaze.

"But if the North Vietnamese were so stubborn, why didn't the Americans drop their bombs on the port instead of in the water?"

"Because they might have hit something! Really, you can't go anywhere in Vietnam studies without realizing that the most crucial battles were fought in the polls!" Dr. K was making me keenly aware of my lack of a Harvard education. "In fact, during 1972, America was riven between the advocates of immediate withdrawal, who wanted all soldiers on a given signal to run from their positions, dive into the ocean, and swim out to troop ships waiting beyond the three-mile limit, and advocates of precipitate withdrawal, who would have made them throw down their guns first — but in the ensuing elections the more militant faction won out — " A spray of bullets interrupted the doctor. He asked for my white shirt which he fastened to the end of a golf club and stuck out the window. "Now — you were saying?"

"Yes — how much of South Vietnam did the Saigon government actually control by the end of the war?"

"About half."

"And how much now?"

"Latitudinally, 400 miles; longitudinally, 40 yards; but it gets much larger when the tide is out. It would seem our peace-keeping efforts have not been completely efficient. But as the country shrank, the job got much easier. We actually caught some infiltrators once, trying to sneak over the border disguised as peasants grazing their tanks — "

"Pretty exciting, eh?"

"Too much so," he sighed, stuffing his pockets with paper clips. "The Bulgarian was so surprised, he mistook our report of their capture for a clerical error and set them all free. We've been hollering for a new Bulgarian ever since — don't suppose they'll want to send one, now — "

"Whatever happened to President Thieu?"

"Shortly after the peace, we encouraged him to resign so that the government could hold free elections and broaden its base — "

"And the new base included — "

"Eleven Vietcong generals, who began to kill, maim, and disembowel in the most democratic manner possible — paper clips — blotter — pens — don't tell me they destroyed my pens! — Ex-president Thieu was so disheartened by the repudiation of his policies that he blew his head off, after cleverly tying his hands behind his back. Several thousand hamlet chiefs and military men followed his example — what shall I do with these pencils?" He held up several fistsful and reluctantly cast them into the flames. "What a waste, what a waste — "

The rocket barrage was so intense I had to shout to make myself heard. "How much aid did the Americans give Hanoi!"

"No one knows!" Dr. K shouted back. "But the North Vietnamese have invested heavily — in the reconstruction of their country — scrap iron, tank rippers, Phantom jets —

A sonic boom shook a framed copy of the Bill of Rights off the wall.

"And how much credit — went to South Vietnam!"

"$5.37! As you know — the United States does not support — filthy dictatorships! Here's the key to the washroom, would you leave it at the desk?"

"One last question — when do you expect the war to end!"

Dr. K wouldn't stay to answer, but his rage was apparent even as he zigzagged low to the ground, between the piles of dead and dying. "But it *has* ended! The war is *over*! There has been peace in Vietnam for eleven years!"

"Then when do you expect the peace to end!"

Dr. K waded hip-deep into the surf and threw his suitcase into a waiting barge.

"The end of the peace is just around the corner! But the South Vietnamese claim to see a light at the end of the tunnel — "

He shoved off just as the first wave of black-pajamaed shock troops broke through the defenses.

"How's that!" I shouted.

He waved from the back of the speeding boat. The United States just sent its first 100 advisers to Hanoi!"

Richard Brookhiser

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think you are — Something special?' My answer was: 'Yes. I am something special. A United States Senator. That is something very special.' " He meant, of course, that the *office* of Senator was special, for it is, in his words, "as destined, to purpose (sic), to mankind (sic), to good for mankind as any poet, artist, inventor or philosopher-prophet (sic). And who agrees with me? Not many here in this land today. At least not as I read the real issues now before us. But Mussolini and Hitler and dictators in South Vietnam, South and North Korea, Spain and South America, and in little nations of despots all over the world. They agree with me. The first people they kill, jail and torture are journalists and lawmakers."

And finally, most ominous of all: "Go on the campaign trail with me. Watch your television. . .the pushing, shoving and villification (sic) that surrounds anyone who stands for office. . .The pushing and shoving and the shooting. It is all a pattern. Everytime you ask a senator, or any elected official 'Who do you think you are?' you fire a bullet at George Wallace or Robert Kennedy. . .you assault the fabric, the very soul of this republic. And just because that elected official does not know who he is, or otherwise abuses his office, that is *no* excuse for the questioner."

Concluding his discussion of the matter on an optimistic note, the Senator reminds us "I am an elected lawmaker. Your last bulwark against dictatorship. I deserve until I am defeated, impeached, or shot, your respect. And I intend to have it." James Abourezk, watch out.

It isn't only Democrats who liven up Capitol Hill, however. The Republican National Committee headquarters, widely regarded as a staid, socially conservative bastion, recently was given a no-liquor on premises" ultimatum by Chairman George Bush, who apparently stumbled on an afternoon post-cocktail party featuring a touch football game between GOP staffers. The final score was not announced.

Watching the early rounds in the battle of the budget one is struck by the claims that Nixon has slashed Federal programs to the bone. At $269 billion it is probably the most expensive bone in history. All of which recalls Hilaire Belloc's brilliant poem, "Epitaph on the Politician Himself":

Here richly, with ridiculous display,
The Politician's corpse was laid away.
While all of his acquaintance sneered
and slanged,
I wept; for I had longed to see him
hanged.

□

Diane Alexander

National Health Care: Solution or Disaster

Medical care costs are rising, and a fearful howl is out for government to "do something." A bewildering procession of solutions is being proposed, everything from organized labor's womb-to-the-tomb medical coverage (costs to be borne by taxes), to President Nixon's partly self-paid, partly tax-paid coverage.

To ensure that we choose the best possible alternative, we must go back and discover exactly what has caused the current steep rise in costs. Then we have the best chance of choosing alternatives which will eliminate the *real* problems, and encourage progress in the saving of lives.

The Causes of the Problem

Today's increase in hospital costs comes primarily from a recent steady rise in salaries of health and medical personnel, a rise which has resulted mainly from a scarcity of personnel in relation to demand for their services. Any time a service or commodity falls into short supply, costs (and thus profits) will rise, acting as an effective, built-in incentive to increase supply by attracting people and cash into the field. This in-flow continues until demand is more or less satisfied, then the magnet loses its strength as profits decrease.

Why, then, has this influx of personnel and cash not occurred in the health services field, filling the current shortage and satisfying demand? The reason is not hard to find: the free market and its balancing mechanisms have been destroyed. Artificial walls have been built around medicine, individuals are prevented from entering the field, incentives for private cash flow have been eliminated, and yet demand for services has been artificially increased.

The artificial walls have been built around the field of medicine in an attempt to improve the quality of medical care. Toward this end all states regulate and license the practice of medicine. The methods chosen for licensing medicine, however, are so far from guaranteeing quality care that many people today, particularly medical educators, are seriously questioning their value.

Robert C. Derbyshire, M.D. in his book *Medical Licensure and Discipline in the United States* describes the current physician licensing practices. In each state a small, government-designated group of doctors (the state's Board of Medical Examiners) is the final arbiter as to which medical schools may set forward their students as candidates for licensing exams, which individuals may practice within the state, and how many physicians that state will have. That is an enormous amount of power, and yet these board members are chosen, not for their medical qualifications, but for their medical-society or party politics. Members have not achieved academic attainments, many are even extremely outdated in their field.

Despite their minimum qualifications, these board members are supposed to choose "good" medicine for their state while banning "bad." Yet no two state boards can agree on what constitutes quality medicine. The absurd situation has therefore developed that what is considered "quality" in one state can be branded "illegal" in another. State boards do agree that a candidate should pass an examination before being licensed, but they cannot agree on the subjects that should be included in the exam. Derbyshire counted a total of fifty-nine different required subjects, many ridiculously obsolete, yet still required *by law*.

States also vary widely on the scores necessary for passing licensing exams. Some states require a relatively high score, with as many as 40 percent of the candidates failing many years; in other states, the score is relatively low, and eight to ten years will pass between failed candidates. According to Derbyshire, at least two states frankly design their exams to "keep the number of physicians at a level optimal to the establishment."

The laws which establish this shoddy screening definitely regulate and mold the practice of medicine, and yet those laws are arbitrary, capricious, and chaotic. They do not guarantee quality to the layman. They do, however, set the practice of medicine in a form as unyielding as concrete because, while knowledge may change rapidly, laws do not.

Instead of guaranteeing better quality medical care, the mishmash of antiquated laws retards progress by prohibiting or discouraging innovations in medical-school curriculum and medical-care practices. The laws were created to discourage quacks and the mediocre, yet both flourish after more than sixty years of regulation piled upon regulation.

There is a very simple reason for these results: there *can* be no "one way" to practice medicine which government can bottle up into a form of license. Knowledge of the human body and its reactions is still too miniscule, despite recent almost-miraculous advances. The practice of medicine still consists of a large amount of trial and error, as can be seen by the fact that many physicians tell their patients, "Take this pill; if it doesn't work, come back and see me!" This is not physician ignorance or carelessness; it is a result of the ignorance of medical science today. It makes no sense, therefore, to create rigid rules, then eliminate practitioners who do not conform to them. We will be hurting ourselves by halting the brilliant along with the fakes.

The government has affected the amount and cost of medical care in more ways than just the licensing of physicians. In 1910, the government began moving to close down some medical schools while restricting enrollment in

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others. This was done to protect the public from an "overproduction of doctors" and thus a "lowering of quality." The result was that, where there were 162 medical schools in 1910, by 1944 there were only 69 — a 57 percent loss in thirty-four years. The output of doctors was thus decreasing, or growing only slowly, at a time when the population was expanding steadily.

Meanwhile, legal barriers were restricting the proliferation of other medical professions, allowing only licensed physicians to perform many activities which could be performed as well, often times better, by other personnel at a small portion of the cost. For years nurses had to fight to gain the legal "right" to take temperatures and blood pressures. Today, army medics are fighting for the "right" to act as physicians' assistants. In these, and many other instances, personnel are being prevented from using skills they are well able to perform; they are prevented because it is so excruciatingly difficult to remove laws from the books once they have been passed.

While the supply of medical schools, doctors, and other personnel was being squeezed by law, the Federal government further compounded the personnel shortage by subsidizing medical research. In order to gain this government money, medical schools began spending more staff time on research and less on teaching, thus aggravating the problem.

Then the Federal government enacted the Hill-Burton Bill which encouraged the building of more hospitals. With more hospitals, there naturally developed a need for more medical personnel. To compete for a first-rate staff, hospital administrators were forced to offer incentives — higher salaries were paid, expensive equipment was bought, and additional services were set up (often in areas where other such equipment or services existed already and the population base was too small to support them all economically.) The resulting inefficiency and higher cost had to be paid for; it was passed on to patients in the form of higher bills.

Finally, in 1966-1967, the crowning blow to hope of lowering health care costs was delivered when Medicare and Medicaid were created. Demand for services multiplied overnight. Any time demand increases, costs will increase unless the supply catches up. In this case, the supply of medical care was still expanding slowly, so costs stayed up. Then, because government reimbursed medical facilities for only a percentage of the costs incurred for Medicare-Medicaid services, the remainder of those costs had to be passed on, too, to the paying patient. No wonder medical bills were skyrocketing.

The Proposed Solution

So there is the problem: the destruction of the market mechanism and the consequent imbalance between supply and demand, quality and cost. Yet the solutions being proposed in Washington today hinge mainly around one idea: find someone — besides the recipient of medical services — to pay the bill. Most proposals want the government (i.e., the taxpayer) to pay all or part of the bill.

This raises an essential moral issue: Does any individual (or group of individuals) have a right to force another to pay for his medical care? Does a poor man's "need" give him a "right" to medical care? The slogan "Health is a right, not a privilege" argues this point of view. But is it any different to force one man to pay for another man's medical care than, say, to force him to pick another man's cotton? Both rob the man of the fruit of his labor; both are questionable on moral grounds.

In addition, forcing the taxpayer to pay the bill for the high cost of medical care will only compound the problem. None of the current national health care schemes will eliminate the strangle hold which a small clique of politically-appointed doctors has gained over the practice of medicine; nor will they encourage a proliferation of alternative types of care and personnel; nor will they lower demand on health services. Instead, the proposed schemes will increase demand many-fold, as happens any time a good or service is offered at a lower price (other things being equal).

We already have scores of examples

of subsidized medicine to examine and learn from, in our own and other countries. The results have always been the same. Services become swamped. Costs skyrocket beyond anyone's expectations. Medical care becomes increasingly unavailable since it is a limited resource and must be rationed in some way; if rationing is not done on the basis of money, it must be done on the basis of time. Doctors have to cut down on the time they spend with each patient, and patients must wait longer to see a doctor or to get into a hospital. (In Great Britain and Sweden, two excellent examples, many operations are delayed months or years because hospitals have waiting lists with hundreds of thousands of names.)

However, this rationing of resources is never enough. A watchdog is always needed to minimize fraud, extravagance, and other misuses by both patients and doctors. A growing, costly government bureaucracy develops, with increasing power to decide who will receive care and how much, which drugs may be used and which are "too expensive," what surgery is necessary and what can "wait," which institutions will get funds and which will not. Instead of having a doctor making medical decisions (which he has spent hard years of study learning to make) that power is more and more placed in the hands of politically-appointed bureaucrats whose main skill is in maintaining favor with government, or in remaining on civil servant lists with tenure for life.

Within this bureaucratic straitjacket, the best doctors become restive and discouraged. Many leave the country in search of better opportunities. (Anthony Lejeune in his booklet "Socialized Medicine Showcase of Failure" reports that with the low pay and depressing, overcrowded, understaffed hospital conditions in Britain, an equivalent of *one-third* the entire annual output of doctors from medical schools migrates to other countries.)

The more government monopolizes control of medical care (as they will if they are paying the bill), the more politics is played. Hospitals and patients compete with one another and with schools, highways, and defense for scarce tax funds. Since the status quo is politically the safest route, few changes are made unless there is some special-interest group hollering for change. Changes come for those who yell loudest or have the most influential friends. A self-feeding circle of stagnation, inefficiency, and rising expenses develops. It results in a population which must spend much of its time yelling or suffer the consequences.

The Alternative

The results of giving the state authority over medical care are inevitably devastating; the solution to our current problem, therefore, is not more and better (or Federal) regulations, it is *complete* removal of government from meddling with the problem it has caused in the first place.

The free market has always proven itself vastly superior to any governmental activity in providing individuals with the services they need and want, and at the best possible price. Under the free market, the number of goods and services available has mushroomed beyond belief, along with the standard of living.

The patronizing excuse with which government undertakes so many of its activities on our account, "The layman is ignorant and does not know how to take care of himself," is often true, since none of us is an expert in every field. However, the free market has developed protective devices whenever there has been a consumer need for them. When the mushrooming of goods and services created a consumer need for help in choosing wisely between the vast array of alternatives, organizations such as the Consumers Union, Better Business Bureau, and Underwriters Laboratory developed to provide that help.

When a need developed in the medical field for a high standard measurement tool which would help judge a medical student's degree of attainment in medical knowledge (the state exams were not doing the job), a group of doctors worked to establish the National Board of Medical Examiners. (In contrast to the exams of the state boards, the National Board's exams have no legal standing whatsoever, and yet they are

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highly respected throughout the country as a certification of ability; many medical schools give the exams to their students as an evaluation of the success of their teaching.)

When it comes to protecting the layman against "bad medicine" one of the best devices that exists today is not the licensing and regulating of government, but the close, careful watch which reputable hospitals keep over the work of their staffs. They keep that watch in order to maintain the good name of their institution. That reputation is something they must work hard and constantly to maintain.

So the free market not only offers the most and best alternatives, it also offers consumer protection. However, it is true that whether we have a free market or a governmental system of medical care, there will always be some low quality medicine and outright fraud being practiced. *Here* is the sphere where government can legitimately take action — when an individual's rights have been infringed and there is a need for the redressing of injustice. Hopefully we and the government will soon recognize that it is just as much an infringement of an individual's rights when the government prevents him from going to the practitioner of his choice (whether M.D., naturopath, witchdoctor, or other variety of medical practitioner) as when a quack fraudulently sells metal rings as a cure against terminal cancer.

So part of the solution to the problem with which we are currently faced is the freeing of the medical field from government control. However, the reduction of the price for treating sickness and disability will not alone solve the problem completely. It has been estimated that our hospitals could be emptied *today* by as much as 50 percent of their patients (thus lowering the cost for medical care by millions of dollars per year) if individuals protected their own health by:

1. wearing seat belts in their automobiles;
2. eating nutritiously;
3. exercising sufficiently;
4. stopping smoking;
5. stopping abuse of drugs and alcohol.

In order to make fast strides toward improving health, we don't need more doctors, medical research, or fairy godmothers to pay the bills, we need to refocus on what we are trying to accomplish — *maintenance* of good health.

The ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of any individual's health *under any system of medical care* will always rest squarely on that individual's own shoulders, not on the state's or the physician's. The physician makes recommendations to the patient, but has no power to enforce them; it is the individual who must decide "Yes" or "No," "I will take this pill," "I will stop smoking," "I will have this doctor perform this operation."

The more we encourage individuals to evade realization of this responsibility, the farther we will be from our goal of reaching each individual's potential optimum health level. That goal will be reached by the individual's own efforts, and by health education (although not of the ineffective kind on which the government is currently spending millions of dollars), as much as (maybe more than) by better, less-expensive medical care.

Especially in today's complex society, government cannot be our watchdog; we have progressed beyond government's ability to cope. So let us remove these arbitrary, damaging governmental restrictions and allow new institutions and personnel to develop. Let us encourage men to be responsible for themselves and their own lives, not chain them to the past while saddling them with the ever increasing burden of paying other people's medical bills. □



The Battle of the Budget

"Money," said a recent congressional newsletter, "is what the war in Washington is all about today." And indeed, the battle of the budget between Congress and President rages on. The Nixon Administration plans to use the parliamentary whip on its Republican troops for what it considers some fifteen "budget busters": i.e., appropriations bills which the Administration claims would cause a tax increase and fuel inflation.

The confrontation over the Federal budget has quickly become (with only rare exceptions) a hotly debated partisan issue; Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott's somewhat cynical statement serves to illustrate the point: "Asking the Democrats to control government spending is like having an alcoholic for your bartender."

The Impoundment of Funds

The Administration's congressional critics are particularly sensitive to what they charge is the President's usurpation of their power, (the "impoundment of funds"). But in a statement by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget before the House Committee on Rules, Mr. Roy Ash argued that the impoundment of Federal funds by the Chief Executive is one of the oldest traditions in American history. In fact, during the Kennedy Administration, Ash pointed out, the impoundment of funds averaged 6 percent of the total unified budget between 1961 and 1963. Under President Johnson the figure fell to 5.4 percent and President Nixon brought the level even lower, to 5 percent between 1969 and 1972. Ash further claimed that as of January 1973 Nixon's impoundment average was at one of the lowest levels in the last fifteen years, 3.5 percent. The Administration, in short, is taking the position that there is no "constitutional" or "impoundment" crisis; the White House believes that the debate over the impoundment of Federal funds has been turned into a rhetorical bandwagon for would-be (and not-so-would-be) presidential aspirants.

The present debate over the impoundment of funds is all the more remarkable when one considers that 37 percent of all impoundments come from the highway trust fund, 25 percent from the budget of the Defense Department, 6 percent from miscellaneous areas such as space, research, and technology. These figures represent 70 percent of all the impounded funds, and it means that only 30 percent comes from human resources.

Since 1973 is not even a political year it can be expected that the political demagoguery coming out of the nation's capital from Democrats and Republicans alike will yet reach even greater proportions. But inflation clearly remains the nation's number one problem. Thus with a Federal budget that is over 70 percent uncontrollable and with prospects of even higher taxes it would seem that the Nixon Administration has all the ammunition it needs to win this battle.

Misplaced National Priorities?

The steam to the engine of inflation, as economists of all creeds recognize, is and always will be irresponsible Federal government spending. During the last decade Federal spending on domestic programs alone has increased 220 percent. Waste was added to inefficiency because Congress lacked the means for a constant and systematic review of existing programs. Although various legislative proposals are currently being considered which would ameliorate the current budgetary process, recognition has not always been the father of reform and there is, unfortunately, no reason to believe that the Ninety-third Congress will be able

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to counter this problem any better than its predecessors.

There are, of course, many critics who argue that there is no fiscal crisis; they charge that our national priorities are misplaced and that if the Federal budget has to be cut at all it should be cut in the area of defense. And indeed, because of the purpose of defense spending, conservatives have been inclined to overlook the cumbersome bureaucratic failures of the Defense Department. But this is no longer true. (Although the "top-heavy" structure of our armed services still remains alarming, e.g., the army only has 4,500 combat spaces for its 50,000 active captains. Our Air Force has two majors for every airplane. And today, with only 2.5 million men under arms — as compared to 12 million during World War II — we now have seven more four-star generals and admirals than we did during the war.)

Under the Nixon Administration, budget priorities for human resources will have grown at an estimated average of 15 percent, from 1970 to 1974. By Fiscal Year 1974 the budget for the Defense Department will drop to $79 billion or 28.4 percent of the total budget at a time when spending on human resources will rise to 47 percent of the total budget. In constant 1974 dollars the total figures for the defense budget are less than they were in 1964, before the Vietnam build-up. The FY 1974 outlays for the Department of Defense is at the lowest level since 1940, when outlays represented 16.6 percent of the total budget. In terms of Gross National Product, defense spending is also at its lowest level since 1950: the figures are ('74) 6 percent and ('50) 4.9 percent respectively.

These figures are particularly startling when it is pointed out that a whopping 56 percent of the current defense budget now goes for manpower costs and it is estimated that 67 percent of the Department of Defense budget could go for manpower costs by 1975. The United States is thus spending substantially less on the research and development of weapons systems than it has been in recent years.

However, given the reorganization of national priorities, congressional critics covering a broad political spectrum have come to realize that the military, like the other sectors of our society, can no longer support lavish programs of dubious merit. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) has pointed to the "godawful waste" and "total inadequacy" of U.S. weapons procurement procedures. An equally strong proponent of the Department of Defense, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), who is also the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has promised to weigh the requests of the Department of Defense "as we have never weighed them before."

"The Time To Act Is Now"

The importance and far-reaching consequences of the current debate over the Federal budget should not be underestimated. During a special order which was held by the freshman class of the Ninety-third Congress, a number of the congressmen used the special order as a vehicle to indicate their concern over our ever-growing fiscal problems. One freshman congressman undoubtedly spoke for many when he said: "I suggest, Mr. Speaker, (the Speaker of the House of Representatives) that unless we do something to reduce that $25 billion which goes down the drain every year in interest on the Federal debt; unless we act to reduce the 43 percent of every taxpayer's earnings which are confiscated by government at all levels; unless we stop debauching our currency long enough to restore international confidence in the dollar, we will have a moral, constitutional, and economic crisis on our hands which will dwarf any of the other problems and evils to which we now address ourselves."

"Mr. Speaker, I suggest that the responsibility for action is ours; and that the time to act is now."

Needless to say, this is one assertion that will not go unchallenged. □

Book Review

The Best and the Brightest

by David Halberstam
Random House, $10.00

The Best and the Brightest is the product of David Halberstam's quest "to find out the full reasons why it (the Vietnam war) had all happened." Although the book is largely based on "some five hundred interviews" and contains not a single footnote, the credulous reader is expected to excuse the author's failure to document his account because "the political climate is somewhat sensitive these days, and the relationship of reporter to source is very much under attack." Under normal circumstances, the author's omission to substantiate his work, coupled with his almost extrasensory capacity to know the innermost thoughts of his subjects, would lead the reviewer to dismiss the book as another lamentable example of declining historiographical standards.

No work by David Halberstam, however, is so lightly dismissed, for as the publisher's puffery points out, when sociologists "polled 150 American intellectuals on the most important influences on their thinking on Vietnam, they responded by naming the late Bernard Fall and Mr. Halberstam." Nor is the author's influence these days simply limited to the academy: *The Best and the Brightest* is flooding suburbia as a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and rivals *Dr. Atkins' Diet Revolution* on the best seller lists. Concern for a responsible understanding of American foreign policy, rather than the intrinsic merits of the book as history, compels us to take *The Best and the Brightest* seriously, for in it Halberstam is attempting to shape public opinion by supplanting old and inescapable realities with new myths and wishful thinking.

The author's thesis, disjointed and scattered throughout 665 pages of text, can be stated as follows. The forces of Ho Chi Minh drove the French out of Vietnam, thereby capturing the nationalism of the country, and becoming a "genuine revolutionary force." American policy-makers, influenced by "the fall of China, the rise of McCarthy, and the Korean War" had become slavish adherents to a belief in monolithic communism and were therefore incapable of seeing "the shades of difference — the fact that Ho, although a communist, might also be primarily Vietnamese." Consequently, when the 1954 Geneva Agreements partitioned Vietnam and established Ho in the North, John Foster Dulles "decided that the rest of the country" would be "a Western bastion against Communists," and Ngo Dinh Diem was "installed" in the South "by foreigners." Diem, "an American creation which fit American needs, not Vietnamese ones, "lacked the support of the peasants. As Viet Cong strength (feeding upon local grievances against the Diem government) grew, Diem "turned to White foreigners for help, for more aid, for air power, for a new treaty with the Americans." The Kennedy Administration, seeing "South Viet Nam as a real country, with a real flag," laboring under the Cold War delusion that force justifies force, and still treating communism as a monolith, responded with advisers and increased aid. Fatally misconceiving the war as primarily military rather than political, the United States by 1964 "found itself face to face with failure." As frustrations mounted in the South, the United States more and more blamed the North, coming to believe that Hanoi was the villain and the source of the war. Assuming that we could affect the outcome of the war, American leaders escalated by pouring in more troops and bombing the North. And above all, "there was a refusal to consider what the alternatives to escalation really were. A question that was almost never raised was whether the Vietnamese might not be better off under Ho, and to what degree the success of the Viet Cong was a measure of this."

Readers of *The Best and the Brightest*, lured by inducements "to

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find out the full reasons why it had all happened," will emerge from the ordeal of reading this badly written work unfulfilled. Despite its enormous wordage, Halberstam's account is remarkable not for what it reveals and explains, but for what it ignores and misconceives. To begin to set the record straight, one need look no farther than to Halberstam's first book on Vietnam, *The Making of a Quagmire*, where we are provided additional insights into how Ho captured the nationalist movement: "The cause was a national and patriotic one, and it camouflaged the hard-core Communist apparatus. Many nationalists joined who were not Communists, others who opposed the Communists were liquidated." Although *The Best and the Brightest* tells us that Diem was "an American creation," we learn in *The Making of a Quagmire* that Ho Chi Minh disagreed: "Because of Diem's reputation as a nationalist, Ho Chi Minh asked him to join Ho's popular front in 1945. Diem refused, the Communists had murdered his eldest brother." John Foster Dulles may have been incapable of distinguishing between Ho the nationalist and Ho the communist, but the distinction was readily apparent to Diem, and to the 800,000 refugees who fled south after the Geneva Agreements.

A central and repetitious theme of Halberstam's present version of events is that Diem — unlike Ho — lacked the support of the peasants, and the guerrilla insurgency in the South was primarily an indigenous movement growing out of Diem's inability to improve the conditions of the peasants. Once again *The Best and the Brightest* is controverted by *The Making of a Quagmire*: "The new Indochina war was not a spontaneous uprising from the South. It was part of a systematic and calculated conspiracy on the part of the Communist government in Hanoi to take over the South. But it was the most subtle kind of a conspiracy, for though Hanoi directed the war, set its pace, controlled its overall strategy and on the international front articulated the propaganda aims of the Vietcong, it did not in those days send North Vietnamese troops to fight in the South. Rather, the *face* of the war was of a purely indigenous uprising." Evidence of the North's motives in launching war on the South is contained in Joseph Buttinger's *Vietnam: An Embattled Dragon*, a book which Halberstam claims to have "carefully read" and lists in his bibliography: "But the North's inability to provide this better life was largely why the Hanoi regime could not resign itself to permanent partition and why the Communists were impelled to attempt to win control of the South by force. Food production, although rising, could not keep pace with the population increase, and the policy of forced industrialization prohibited imports that might have relieved the appalling shortage of consumer goods. The hectic pace at which the collectivization of agriculture was pursued beginning early in 1958 increased the regime's difficulties with the peasants." Even if we accept Halberstam's interpretation of the opposition to Diem, we cannot escape the fact that the regimes which replaced him continued the war at a terrible cost; for as Sir Robert Thompson reminds us: "It is only necessary to look at the chain of events in South Vietnam since 1963, from the time of the Buddhist controversy which led to the fall of President Diem, to realize that, if the Vietcong had had a good cause within South Vietnam, the whole country would have collapsed long ago."

Halberstam's refusal to acknowledge that the North's aggression against the South was the primary cause of the war is the basis of his inability to comprehend the true nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The central tenet of post-World War II American foreign policy is to avoid war by threatening war. The success of this policy, based upon the hard-learned lesson that the toleration of aggression breeds only further aggression, depends upon the credibility of the United States' threat to meet force with force. The paramount issue raised by Vietnam was whether the United States would respond to an armed communist attempt to alter the status quo. In measuring its response to the North Vietnamese challenge, the Kennedy Administration's major concern was what would our opponents conclude about American determination from our actions or failure to act. Rather than failing "to consider what the alternatives to escalation really were," American policymakers rejected the inescapable alternative to meeting the North Vietnamese challenge: the collapse of American credibility in Southeast Asia and shaken confidence in our resolution elsewhere in the world. Halberstam's claim that our involvement in Vietnam was the knee-jerk response of believers in a monolithic communist conspiracy is untenable; American policymakers had gone to college and knew that communism was not monolithic. Despite divisions and rivalries in the communist world, a failure to respond to North Vietnamese aggression would have permitted, among others, the Chinese, the Cubans, and the Russians to draw dangerous conclusions about American determination to respond to their separate and distinct violations of the status quo.

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
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The author's naive assertion that American policymakers were motivated by a simplistic belief in monolithic communism merely reveals that he does not understand the elements of a deterrent foreign policy.

The conclusion suggested by Halberstam's account is that the United States became entangled in an unfortunate and costly war for a country not worth the price; therefore, we should learn our lesson and shun involvement in such wars in the future. This is perhaps the most dangerous conclusion one could draw from our Vietnam ordeal. The war in Vietnam represents one of the few instances when an aggressor has challenged the credibility of the American promise to retaliate. Our struggle in Vietnam to maintain U.S. credibility is the best evidence that can be offered to potential aggressors of our continuing determination to oppose violations of the status quo. In the words of James Payne: "The correct interpretation of our action in Vietnam is that is shows what we can do and will do *and do again* to defend our position. To reverse this interpretation, to tell the world that we shall never fight again in Southeast Asia is to weaken our threat and encourage aggression. It is difficult to imagine a more senseless way to squander the American blood that has been shed in Vietnam."

Terry O'Rourke

Book Review

Rebellion in the University

by Seymour Martin Lipset
Little, Brown, & Co., $3.95 pb.

There are two ways of explaining the rise of student activism over the last ten or fifteen years, and no matter who you are — historian, journalist, curious observer — your views are bound to lean toward one side or the other. You either conclude that student movements have been political movements and that activism is a means chosen by students to react to and influence the "issues." Or you believe that student movements are not deliberately political at all, but rather intellectualized frustration, an involuntary reaction to widespread cultural changes which the students themselves do not comprehend.

Back in the early sixties, the "political" model generally prevailed. Student activists, it was then believed, fought for radical, but definitive programs of political redress. They joined battle as allies of their liberal parents, first as the more daring standard-bearers of Kennedy's civil rights legions, and later, when the movement mushroomed, as partakers of the intellectuals' legitimate "sense of outrage" against the domestic status quo and Johnson's foreign policy. Many of the professors and journalists who argued that activism was best understood "politically" (and indeed there were many of them) were frank apologists for the radical position: freedom riding and SNCC, they told us, were welcome cures for our medieval, racist hangover, and teach-ins and SDS gave us a well-deserved chastizing for Southeast Asian imperialism run wild.

But what was more important was that even the detached observers, the non-apologists who attempted quite objective analyses of the student movement phenomenon, agreed before 1968 that specific "political" issues—especially the war and domestic, social inequality — were the single, most important cause of activism. People whom we would today call moderates — Nathan Glazer in his essays, Nelson Rockefeller in his speeches, Walter Lippmann in his interviews — never questioned that politics was at the root of it all, however much they would disagree with the activists' key positions. It was assumed, in the words of *The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest* that "the best place to begin any search for the causes of student protest is to consider the reasons which student protesters themselves offer for their activities."

Then in the late sixties came a reaction of sorts, when the credulity of the American intellectual public was at last pushed beyond limits. The public likened itself to a doctor watching a patient slowly lose his sanity, and reasoned that the diagnosis of one and the self-diagnosis of the other must finally part company. It had seen too many fruitless "confrontations," too many "symbolic protests," too much hysteria and unreason having nothing to do with the "issues," in fact, too complete a tide of anti-intellectualism that seemed intent, as its primary goal, on *not* being understood politically at all. And perhaps it listened too closely to that Neo-Machiavellian confession of Mark Rudd of the Columbia SDS: "Let me tell you. We manufactured the issues . . ." In any event, conservative professors who had finally found an audience and moderate professors whose liberalism had been stung by the movement's excesses signaled a retreat from the "issues."

In 1969 and 1971 two monumental and distinctly "non-political" analyses of student movements appeared: Louis Feuer's *The Conflict of Generations* and Robert Nisbet's *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma*. In a short while, the "non-political" approach came to dominate the subject, and student-watchers of the academy, now freed from the shadow-world of ideological causes, have tended increasingly to seek an explanation in historical forces utterly beyond the students' understanding or control. The trend is to disregard what the activist has to say about his own motives: he has no idea why he is rebelling; the answers are to be found in his upbringing, or in the breakdown of institutions, or in the students' own subconscious turmoil. Today many people are prepared to agree with Robert Nisbet that "in retrospect it is plain that the specific reasons given by the earliest student insurrectionaries . . . only partly explain the pattern of uprisings" — or do not explain it at all.

So student movementology has its own trends and its own dialectic, and in light of these, Seymour M. Lipset's odd new addition to the field, *Rebellion in the University*, is something of a disappointment. Lipset has written an essentially "political" analysis at a time when such efforts are not in vogue. This alone is fine. But Lipset fails to defend himself effectively against the adverse currents of prevailing opinion, and this is his work's fundamental weakness. To its credit, *Rebellion* has all the outward signs of a masterpiece. Lipset successfully wrests his subject from the feverish clutches of current events and puts it where it belongs — now that activism has hit a lull — into the past tense of history, and so lends his writing a welcome reserve. His vast storehouse of data is worthy of perusal even for the reader who disagrees with everything else. And at the risk of sounding inconclusive, Lipset shows his customary genius at giving every argument a fair hearing and a sympathetic discussion. Still, *Rebellion* is crippled by Lipset's refusal to consider seriously the adversary position of his colleagues. Not only are his attempts to refute their "non-political" approach few and poor — what is worse, his own thesis is eminently attackable from their point of view.

In his first chapter, Lipset separates the causes of student unrest into two categories: "motivating factors," the specific political issues which trigger each activist movement, and "facilitating factors," the broader conditions which seem to encourage students, more than any other group in our society, to engage in radical politics. In his own diffuse way, Lipset comes out in favor of "motivating factors," and just about sums up his thesis on page 37: "the larger explanation for the rise of activism during the past half decade or so must lie primarily in political events: the emergence of the civil rights and Vietnam issues in a particular post-Stalinist political epoch." Furthermore, of the "facilitating factors" that he will accept, nearly all are at least vaguely understood as grievances by the radicals themselves: increasing size and bureaucratization of the university, impersonal teaching methods, greater emphasis on competition for post-grad employment, the "suspended adolescence" of students whose average age continues to increase, and so forth.

Finding the causes of student unrest is relatively easy for Lipset. It is simply

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a matter of talking to students, taking polls, demonstrating the rather self-evident truth that adherence to New Left ideology characterizes the activists better than anything else, and concluding that radicals choose to be radicals and therefore must know what they are doing. In effect, Lipset is hearkening back to an early sixties' optimism which assumed that a person need only be educated to be capable of political decision-making. And since students are better educated than anyone else, obviously their actions are most profitably explained as "political," as the result of reasonable deliberation over "issues."

Campus activity in the late sixties, however, taught us a hard lesson which Lipset has overlooked, and it is something that western political thought from Aristotle to Bentham has held all along: namely, that identifiable self-interests and a set of accepted institutions which delimit and mediate these interests are at least as important to political decision-making as education. This is nothing obscure; in fact, we could hardly understand history otherwise. We explain the decision to form labor unions, for example, by examining the specific interests of certain social classes (for higher wages and better job conditions) and the institutions (legislatures, courts, corporations) these classes had to work with and cope with. Without mentioning the "stretch-out" system on the one hand, or the N.R.A. on the other, our explanations could not carry much weight. To talk primarily about the ideologies espoused by union participants — which is what Lipset does when it comes to student activists — is just not good enough.

Yet what *are* the interests of students? They cannot have much to do with wealth: most activists come from middle or upper-middle class homes and have had least reason to oppose the system on economic grounds. Nor can they have much to do with power: "establishment" politics are rarely taken seriously by activists. Nor can they be a special attachment to any of society's more permanent institutions — e.g., steady employment, family, neighborhood: students are not yet participants. And what *are* the institutions chosen by activists to push their "issues"? No one has ever been better able to equalize social conditions or stop foreign military intervention than the Federal government. But strangely enough activists disdained any association with the one administration which enacted unprecedented civil rights legislation, as well as the next administration which ended the Vietnam war and cut the size of our army in half. If, as Tom Hayden believes, "the students are in opposition to the fundamental institutions of our society" through symbolic, not substantive "anti-politics," one wonders how political explanations of student unrest have survived at all.

Indeed, it now appears to many observers that our only recourse — Lipset notwithstanding — is the "non-political" explanation, the flat assertion that students revolt simply to escape alienation from themselves and society. This is a simplistic analysis, perhaps a bit trite, but it is quite consistent with the activists' general lack of self-definition and their refusal to accept authority or organization in pursuing their "issues." The alienated person acts for nothing but the sake of the act. Irving Kristol said it very well as early as 1965 in the *Atlantic*: "The new student radicalism is so fundamentally at odds with our conventional political categories because it is, above all, an existentialist revolt. The term is unfortunately chic, and ambiguous too. But in this context it has a fairly definite meaning: the students are in rebellion not so much because things are bad for themselves or for others, but because things are what they are for them and others." Once you agree with Kristol, you stop looking at the "issues" and start looking at the preconditions which bring about such a situation. This may be a tragic way to approach anyone's behavior, but Lipset has not yet developed the antidote for our new-found, "non-political" pessimism.

Lewis Feuer, in his giant, comparative study of the history of student movements, *The Conflict of Generations*, concludes that the two most important causes of student activism are, first, a moral "de-authoritization" of the values and institutions of the older generation, a prevailing feeling shared by the young

but initiated by the old that the gerontocracy has failed and its traditions are worthless; and second, a society-wide conviction — abetted by the anxiety of rapid social change — that not only are the old values worthless, they are outmoded, and that the future lies with youth. Feuer's "causes" are not speculations. They are based on extensive study of the political history, the art, and the personal documents of the times. It is a "non-political," indeed almost determinist analysis, for it claims that vicissitudes of history are really to blame, and that the movements themselves are but an inevitable and largely irrational result.

Lipset tries to contradict Feuer by arguing that these are merely necessary (not sufficient) causes and of doubtful importance. Student movements, he claims, are not inevitable; "de-authoritization" and rapid social change in many cases not mentioned by Feuer yield no student activism whatsoever. Moreover, Lipset's data (at least of the American movement in the sixties) would appear to refute Feuer's thesis that student movements are only part of a generation-wide rebellion, born of widespread disrespect for existing institutions. Actually, according to Lipset's polls, the younger generation has taken a more conservative stand on many vital issues (e.g., Vietnam) than the older generation. Though students do tend to be liberal, the gap between generations is not nearly so wide as the gap between students and young non-students.

But Lipset's critique itself deserves criticism. Granted, Feuer's "causes" are not absolutely inevitable and are perhaps only a partial explanation, but Lipset's own political theories could not even begin to pass the same test. Are we to infer from Lipset that every time a nation wages an unpopular war, or that every time a society has racial strife, while its students are left-oriented, that moratoriums, sit-ins, and riots will beset its universities? One hopes not — this would be a bizarre analysis indeed. He is also wrong to belittle the generational aspect of student movements. Were Lipset's outlook not so narrowly political, he would better appreciate the overriding force of the "youth culture" on which most of the activists' "issues" are founded. Youth may not be more "liberal," but Lipset's own findings confirm that they are far more radical (i.e., given to political extremes), and this is a sign of an attitudinal, even emotional gap, rather than a political gap.

Robert Nisbet in *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma* offers us another variation of the "non-political" approach, one that would blame the *causus belli* not on the generation gap, but on the university. In a provocative and insightful argument, Nisbet directly connects the decline of academia and the rise of student movements. Until the 1940s in the United States, he writes, the university was our last medieval institution, an enclosed hierarchical world, with its own unquestioned "dogma," its own sense of honor, and its own elitist spirit of community. Just like any other medieval institution, it was "degraded" by capitalism (in the fifties, as an emphasis on public service, product development, mass teaching methods, and the "managerial" administration) and the "Last Reformation" (in the sixties, as the spiritual and egalitarian goals of student movements). After the former, goes this rather determinist argument, the latter was a certainty: "Thus, when the student militants began their onslaught against the university and its system of authority in the early 60s, their work was made easy . . . . It was the prior destruction of academic authority that in very large measure caused the student uprisings."

Again, Lipset objects on the basis of his polls. Not only do students uniformly agree that the university is our "strongest" and "healthiest" institution, he claims, but it also seems that students are far more likely to join a movement if they are politically Left (and this in turn reflects their parents) than if they are dissatisfied with their campus. A politically moderate student who has a very low regard for the university is still generally not an activist. Lipset, in effect, defends a voluntarist approach and maintains that students make rational, comprehensible choices: only those who believe in radical social and political change join student movements, while others can subordinate the "uni-

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versity issue" to overriding, moderate political convictions.

But Lipset begs the original question. In fact, there have always been left-wing students and left-wing parents (in the 1930s they were everywhere). Yet why is it that only in the 1960s have the universities succumbed to their assault? Most students, as Lipset insists, may think highly of their university, but so long as campuses suffer for such unrelated issues as the Vietnam war, this finding seems rather unimportant. What counts is not the activists' opinion of the university as it is recorded in a poll, but the actual effect of student movements on how a university functions. And activists have amply demonstrated — in deed if not in word — that they hold no regard for academia's liberal principles of free inquiry.

Ironically, Lipset uses these same principles to justify the history of activism on American campuses, and to reaffirm the "open marketplace" liberalism of Newman and Dewey. Intellectuals and universities, he writes, expect for brief intervals in our history, have always taken divergent, idealistic, and potentially "revolutionary" stands. Lipset quotes Daniel P. Moynihan: since "about 1840, the cultural elite have pretty generally rejected the values and activities of the larger society." And according to Lipset's documentary, student "rebellion" itself has been a feature of the American university since the ideological ferment of the French Revolution. Lipset concludes that student movements have always been a sort of stable, ongoing dialectic between students and the outside world, in fact, almost a tradition. The movement of the sixties may be larger and may embrace different goals, but it is no different, in its essence, than what we have put up with for two centuries — and it can be understood as we have always understood discontent among intellectuals.

Lipset's historical interpretation contrasts violently with the findings of Feuer and Nisbet. Whereas Lipset sees a long continuum of American student movements since the late eighteenth century, Feuer emphatically denies that any kind of student movement existed in the United States before the year 1960. Compared to the violence and numbers of students involved in Russia and Western Europe, he writes, the American scene has been virtually stagnant; in fact, the American student, who traditionally saw himself as aristocratic, Republican, and profoundly conservative, until the 1930s looked with disdain on the European student "mob." What disturbances did take place on American campuses, according to Feuer, were protests against the strict *in loco parentis* rules of campus authorities; they had few political overtones. Nisbet would seem to agree, and regards the 1940s and 1950s as a period of radical transition in the function and character of the American university — which directly inspired the student rebellion.

In terms of historiography, the difference between Lipset's "political" approach and Feuer-Nisbet's "non-political" approach is a difference between a voluntarist emphasis on choice and a determinist emphasis on situation. The "voluntarist" seeks historical developments that legitimize the student movement as a sort of tradition or institution among free-thinking people. To use the terminology of the *President's Report*, he defines the student movement not as a "problem," but as a "condition, a fact of modern life . . . ." Very likely he agrees with Lipset's observation that student activists' beliefs are based on a strongly-defended convention of intellectual dissent. These points granted, he can more easily argue that the course of a student movement is steered by the conscionable decisions of rational people.

The "determinist," on the other hand, regards student movements as a specific and peculiar aberration of modern history. He argues that student movements,

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Review articles on important new books in the field of international relations

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because they are nihilistically opposed to traditional bases of intelligible decision-making, are also ahistorical — that is, they take place *outside* history. He may, like Feuer, claim that student movements disrupt the generational equilibrium," and are *ipso facto* a sign of a sickness, a malady in society." Distrusting the opinions of the participants, he searches instead for broader theories of precipitant cultural change.

It might be said that a struggle persists between these two points of view, but if so, it is clearly one-sided. In recent years the political" approach has lost almost all the respectability it once had, and, though Lipset would dissent, the gist of the non-political" mode has won near-unanimous approval from both laymen and academicians. One suspects that this shift of perspective has less to do with any scholarly, disinterested pursuit of truth than it does with the American public's own experience with student movements. When old myths fell apart in the late 1960s, only analyses like those of Feuer and Nisbet were able to admit how much we did not know, ask the profound questions, and then present with clarity what little we *do* know.

The potential weakness of the political" approach, specifically, a weakness that detracts from Lipset's book, is an overly optimistic faith in the reasonableness of people. Lipset emphasizes conscious, political decision-making to the exclusion of cultural normalities and abnormalities that are the very basis of politics. We should be skeptical, for instance, of Lipset's reliance on polls. Lipset cites numerous polls that affirm student confidence in the worth and durability of conservative social values and democratic political institutions. But to what extent will the sweet air of rationality which surrounds a poll-taker affect the behavior of an excited student engaged in a riot? Youth is notorious for the gap between ideals and action, and even Lipset admits (quoting a study he himself inspired) that "leftists who have demonstrated intolerance and authoritarian behavior traits in practice may still give voice or pencil to liberal values in principle."

From the Fascists we learned that an unusual historical situation can make the whole idea of the "rational" decision — based on accepted political, social, or economic interests — superfluous. Feuer and Nisbet examine the historical situation prudently; Lipset does not. It may well be, as the public fears, that certain tendencies of the American student movement in the sixties were fundamentally new to the tradition of intellectual dissent. And perhaps these should be (or should have been) strongly opposed as destructive to liberal free inquiry.

Neil Howe

Book Review

The Case for American Medicine

by Harry Schwartz
McKay, $6.95

Recent warnings about an alleged shortage of 50,000 doctors proves the point of a new book that "statistical myths die hard."

The book, *The Case for American Medicine*, is by Harry Schwartz of *The New York Times*. Himself a liberal, Schwartz demolishes the liberal myths upon which are built the campaign to destroy the private practice of medicine in the United States. The figure of 50,000, Schwartz writes, "has remained constant since the mid-1960s, though what factual base, if any, lies behind it is extremely obscure." But even accepting the fantasy figure for the sake of argument, "by the end of 1971 the number of physicians had already increased by more than 50,000, yet the talk about a shortage of 50,000 still went on as though nothing had happened."

In fact, the talk continues to this day. Dr. A.D. Cooper, president of the Association of American Medical Colleges, predicted this week that the shortage of 50,000 doctors can be eradicated only through a new infusion of federal funds into medical schools. AAMC has a financial interest in keeping the shortage myth breathing since, because of the alleged crisis, the Federal government pays bonuses to medical schools to enlarge enrollment and turn out more graduates.

In puncturing liberal mythology about the state of American medicine, Schwartz builds a formidable case for the continuation of private practice based on the traditional fee system. Contrary to the shortage fable, Schwartz produces statistics which demonstrate that the supply of doctors is increasing faster than the population. In 1950 there were 711 Americans for every doctor. By 1965 when the shortage myth was born, the figure had dropped to 682. In 1972 there were an estimated 600 people per doctor, a figure likely to decline because of already higher medical school enrollment. Schwartz warns that an overall doctor surplus "would create the tendency to overtreat, overprescribe and overoperate" — all of which would make medical care more expensive. Critics claim that the alleged doctor shortage has already created the condition. At the same time, however, the myth-makers contend that doctors are overworked — which must make them a masochistic lot, indeed. Schwartz suspects there is already an oversupply of doctors in some categories. He points to an article by Dr. W.P. Longmire in the *American Journal of Surgery* as evidence. Back in 1965, Dr. Longmire wrote that ". . . in each community in our country there are a few surgeons who are doing all or more than they humanely can do. Many, though, are working at a pace far below capacity."

Schwartz says the biggest problem confronting health care is the distribution of doctors — too many in too few places. He adds, however, that this is a problem which not even socialized medicine behind the Iron Curtain has been able to solve. As a possible answer, Schwartz suggests tax incentives to encourage doctors to practice in small towns and rural areas.

That myths about medical shortages have a way of generating real surpluses can be seen from the explosion of hospital construction as the consequence of an earlier "health crisis." As a result, Schwartz says, "in 1971 probably more than $4 billion was expended on maintenance of empty hospital beds." That $4 billion was paid by patients and non-patients alike through bigger hospital bills, increased insurance rates, and higher government medical expenditures.

Schwartz notes that opponents of private medicine have themselves forced up medical costs, a condition they use to argue for nationalized health care. For example, most of these critics supported enactment of Medicare-Medicaid, embryonic socialized medicine whose massive expenditures "promptly pushed up prices for almost every element in the health care system. Since politicians dislike admitting their mistakes, scapegoats had to be found." They were — the very doctors who had opposed Medicare-Medicaid in the first place. As another example, Schwartz points to Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers and major supporter of Senator Edward Kennedy's nationalized medical program. Woodcock condemns rising hospital costs while also demanding higher wages for union members who work in hospitals.

Schwartz saves his sharpest scalpel to expose the Health Maintenance Organization, pre-paid medical service which, to one degree or another, both President Nixon and Senator Kennedy endorse as a nationalized medical program. HMO, private versions of which have been in existence in this country for a number of years, is similar to socialized medicine. Under HMO the patient pays a direct fee which entitles him to "free" medical care. Under socialized medicine, the patient pays his fees through taxation. Examining both socialized medicine and HMO, Schwartz remarks on the similarity of defects: patient complaints about long waits, difficulty in obtaining medical attention in an emergency, loss of privacy during physical examinations, impersonal care, and the lack of a doctor-patient relationship.

HMO officials are not as enthusiastic about the system as are outside proponents. The president of what is considered a model HMO declares that "we ourselves don't see Kaiser-Permanente as a panacea." One of the K-P founders says that the elimination of fees "over-

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loads the system" with hypochondriacs which "actually interferes with the care of the sick." The same criticism has been leveled at socialized medicine.

Proponents of a nationalized HMO claim, on the basis of the private HMOs, there would be massive savings in a large, unified system. Fact one: HMO expenditures are going up about as fast as costs for individual doctor service. Fact two: Private HMOs generally provide group coverage only for working people, which excludes the poor and elderly who frequently, however, obtain free medical care from private doctors. A Federal HMO would have to serve everybody, not just those who could afford to pay. Fact three: Almost half of the people under HMO also use outside doctors, which at least suggests that HMO is not satisfactory as the only system of health care.

Perhaps the most damaging — and frightening — shortcoming of HMO is that while proponents claim it offers a financial incentive for the medical profession to keep people healthy, Schwartz finds that "HMO has an equally strong economic interest in having its seriously ill patients die quickly and inexpensively." In Great Britain, for example, there is medical support for mercy killing of old people with chronic ill nesses in order to alleviate the tremendous tax strain caused by socialized medicine.

"What is most astounding about the push for HMOs," Schwartz concludes, "is the insensitivity to the spirit of the times. We live in an age of alienation, when millions are suspicious of huge organizations which reduce them to numbers on punched cards. And nowhere are human contact and sympathy more important than in medicine." Unfortunately, "the political pressure is all the other way toward repeating errors of bureaucratic gigantism that have gotten us into the present mess in so many fields of American life."

W.J. Griffith, III



Last Brando on the Reservation

Her $850 brushed suede-skins and $400 primitive Oglala beads and complete Max Factor facial were, of course, perfect. Little Princess Littlefeather, the (perhaps partly) Indian professional girl despatched by Don Marloneone to the late Oscarfest, looked splendid, lacking only a few puffs of smoke to telegraph her message from the Don: "Me mad 'bout flick not-niceness to Indian; me no take little gilded man called Oscar; me speak with straight tongue, commune with Indian brothers at Wounded Knee." Me want to vomit that night, watching Don Marloneone's hoked-up little hooker doing her number for the greater glory of the Don and the delinquents avenging Geronimo in South Dakota. I *had* thought that the Prairie Avenger's imposition of himself on us throughout the 1972 campaign sufficed for South Dakota's impudence this decade; I erred.

How to get Don Marloneone's tinsely gesture out of mind and Marlon Brando the splendid actor back into focus? 'Taint easy, McGoo. Left and Right, the commentators won't divorce the activist from the actor. For example, Mr. George Frazier, resident style-arbiter in the liberal *Boston Globe*, practically suffered seizure in a recent column as he licked the teepee floor on which Marlon Brando trod that Oscar-eve; of his "beau geste," Mr. Frazier could say only good; of Brando, Frazier acknowledges that he is "awed" by "our greatest actor"; of those that night and thereafter who nay-say the Brandoesque gesture, Mr. Frazier could only sputter insults that make mine of him seem like love bubbles. On the other side, Mr. Buckley reminds us (and saves me the bother of having to remind us) that Marloneone has found the most ingenious ways of justifying his *Godfather* role — "I think *The Godfather* is about the corporate mind," Brando declares. "In a way, the Mafia is the best example of capitalists we have. Don Corleone is just any ordinary American business magnate who is trying to do the best he can for the group he represents and for his family" — then he casts stones at Hollywood's glass houses for Hollywood's mistreatment of the Indian.

Not that a glib disregard of the legitimate plight of the Indian is intended by these remarks. (A gentle reader wrote to tell me, after deep study of my output in this and other magazines over the past six months, that if I could "find a fag nigger Injun to defend" I'd "be in seventh heaven.") It's just that I do not particularly like to take my political cues from racy show folk, and wish very much that they'd behave like cab drivers and opine in small audience situations instead of unburdening their guilt on us in public. Well, the Brando ploy will long be remembered, and surely little Ms. Littlefeather is on her way to a glorious career in show biz. As for Brando himself, his politics is on about the level of sophistication of Shirley MacLaine and Joanne Woodward and probably deserves no more comment.

But let no one gainsay the Brando achievements: Stanley in *Streetcar Named Desire* (1952); Antony in *Julius Caesar* (1953); Sakini in *Teahouse of the August Moon* (1956); *Sayonara* (1957); *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1962); at least ten minutes of *Reflections in a Golden Eye* (1967); and his physical presence, if not his spoken scenes, in *The Godfather* (1972). By any standard, that's a record of no little significance.

Now, Brando as Paul in *Last Tango in Paris*, the current Bernardo Bertolucci film that Miss Pauline Kael almost single-handedly made into a sensation months before it opened, merely by devoting about eight million words of adulation to it in the October 28, 1972 issue of *The New Yorker*. With a build-up like that, and the promise that Brando would bare his behind for all the world to see, *Last Tango* could not fail.

Add ı to that the *Playboy* magazine out-takes in gorgeous living color, the *Time* and *Newsweek* stories on *Last Tango* (and is it really true that somewhere in Spraypaint Village — New York to you — there's a computer designed to turn out virtually identical stories for the two great weekly newsmagazines on the same or adjacent Mondays?); add all that to the reserved seat treatment, and to those full-page ads of Brando buff playing toesies with Maria Schneider, and you've got yourself one hell of an advance sale.

Yet the film has its moments, largely Brando's, though Stanley Kauffmann makes a good point in *The New Republic*, observing the physical fakery of this "art" film masquerading as porn masquerading as art. "Porn" lifts sex out of context and is effective solely to the extent that it arouses sexual yearnings; "art" is supposed to transcend that. Let's be frank and admit once and for all that what people call "art" when differentiating it from film "pornography" is usually merely less explicit sex; somehow implicitness spells "art" to some

Author's Query

I am writing an ethno-socio-history dissertation on "The Place of the 1953 Buick in Afro American Cultural Life," and I would appreciate the assistance of any brother or sister who could put me in touch with beautiful stories relating to 1953 Buicks.

Jamal Abdula Washington
Department of Mysterious
African Studies
Rammal Coffey Institute
Iowa City, Iowa

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people while explicitness means "porn." Here's the rub in *Last Tango*: while the lovely young Maria Schneider, who plays Jeanne, Brando's three-day trick, shows all, Brando is discreetly protected from the full-front treatment: that is prurience and it is, as Kauffmann says, "fake."

The force of *Last Tango* is not, contrary to legend, its sexual directness, which is greatly overstated by commentators and quite tame in this film, compared to many others in recent years. Its force and vitality is in its exploration of the mind of a man so distraught owing to his wife's death, so temporarily insecure about his manhood, that he sinks to the depths of debasement to expunge his misery. The movie should not, please, be dismissed as "dirty"; that simply is not a good reason in any case for pooh-poohing a film and here it really doesn't apply.

I ask of a "serious" movie not that it make me think better of things, but that it make me think. *Last Tango in Paris*, for all its male chauvinism, for all its distracting touches of artiness, for all its oversell, does make me think. About many things, about the talents of Bernardo Bertolucci, Maria Schneider, Jean-Pierre Leaud, about the tenuous relationship of love to sex, and about Marlon Brando, whose brilliance as an actor is confirmed once again. It would be a pity were he to stay on the reservation. Come home Don Marloneone, you're needed in Hollywood. □

Book Review

The New Chastity

— and other Arguments Against Womens Liberation

by Midge Decter
Coward-McCann, $6.95

For several years it has been impossible for a woman to live in her own apartment, hold a responsible job, or make an intelligent remark without having some wiseacre sidle up and ask knowingly, "You a member of Women's Lib?"

Many women have no answer, because they may approve of some goals of Women's Liberation and despise others. Not all women who have their eyes open are unhappy, but clearly there is a major malaise among American women. Whether it is peculiar to them is moot, since many think they have a monopoly on this troubled spirit. In cases of desertion or divorce, it is all that some women have.

Great American Series

Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.

— John Adams

Card-carrying parrots of Big Sister and easily threatened men who specialize in brute put-downs have failed to grasp the complexity of the woman problem. Assuming an endless litany of grievances for both sexes to recite, where does a sensitive person begin to construct a sensible pattern for living?

Midge Decter starts by pouncing on some of the radical claims of Women's Liberation. She confines herself to domestic complaints, which she elegantly labels, in the style of her adversaries, "Shitwork," "The Beast With Two Backs," "Wiving," and "Breeding." Each subject is introduced with a recap of the written literature of Women's Liberation. Much of this original rhetoric has all the stylistic thrill of a diabetic coma, and it gains little in the retelling.

Spokeswomen (excuse me, spokespersons) claim that women are oppressed, says Decter, but in fact they enjoy freedoms they can't handle. No female today has to become a housewife, a lover, a wife, or a mother. She chooses these things; they are not forced on her. If she decides not to perform these roles, she has no right to whine about social pressures that would have her be otherwise. For, in the author's view, the freedom to be a housewife is complemented by the option of having another career and sharing housework or paying servants; the freedom to have a lover or husband or child is also the freedom to have none. In fact, she concludes, the voluntary nature of these tasks places excruciating pressure on a woman to perform them perfectly.

Women's Liberationists who reject traditional female roles are avoiding responsibility, Decter says, avoiding "a life in hostage to the rhythms of time and mortality, to the needs and thus the ephemerality of flesh, and to the risks of opening oneself, making oneself available, to the demands of others."

The assertions of the author — counter-assertions to the Liberationists — are filled with eminently attackable generalizations of female psychology based on her personal perceptions. Example: "For a woman, coitus is a happenstance, roused and dispensed with on the same occasion, being only itself and touching nothing else."

Decter's willingness to be subjective leads, on the other hand, to intriguing but equally unverifiable insights. Of housework, she says that, rather than the lack of responsibility which Betty Friedan claimed was the root of dissatisfaction, the housewife "experiences this life as a constant process of decision and so a constant assumption of responsibility." Of the young girl on the verge of sexual initiation, she says, "Since there were no standards of conduct, either to obey or to violate, since she herself was to be the arbiter and the standard, she was pressed into a species of self-knowledge it had once been one of the purposes of sexual games and encounters to help her to attain to." And, hardly her most profound statement, but one of the more invidious: "It is difficult to say just how large a contingent of lesbians has been exerting influence on and through Women's Liberation. One's impression is that it is rather large." There. Somebody said it.

This candor is no doubt one reason for the apoplexy of doctrinaire Liberationists. Another reason is the condescending, almost snide tone which dodges in and out of the writing. While a good astringent wave of argument has been needed badly for some time, perhaps the author has indulged herself at the expense of productive discussion of what is at least perceived by many as a crippling personal and social problem.

The deliberately limited scope of the book gives Decter room for an unmitigated assault on the theoretical underpinnings of the movement, but by demolishing the logic she does not make

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The Bootblack Stand

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at *avant-garde* bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled *What's in It for Me?* Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

The recent outbursts of Jane Fonda against our POW's are inexplicable to me. I do not know what she is up to, but I am sure she is up to something. After all, who isn't?

Sincerely,
George Bush
Republican National Chairman

Dear George:

The intentions of Madame Fonda are really quite simple, but then what does one expect from a creature whose complexity is on a par, say, with the amoeba? What Madame Fonda is really up to when she calls our POW's war criminals and the like is nothing less than the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination. She obviously thinks that if she continues uttering these audacious political pronouncements, the Democrats will crown her — a development dearly to be desired by all high-ranking Republicans. For if she wins the nomination, there will be no need ever to bug her headquarters. All Americans will be instantly aware of the most fleeting thought to gambol and lurch through her mind.

—GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

I hate to bother you twice in one month, but I am terribly concerned about a little indecorum out here in Washington which the press has inflated into a hugh scandal. I am referring to the Watergate matter. How do you suppose we should handle it?

Sincerely,
George Bush
Republican National Chairman

Dear Mr. Bush:

How glad I am that you have written me! The whole matter is obviously another episode in symbolic politics — and Republican sachems are to be congratulated rather than persecuted for their panache. The Watergate Affair was a puckish attempt to reveal to the American citizenry that the Democratic Headquarters is inhabited by wierdos.

The brave men involved in this forward-looking bit of political symbolism are legitimate idealists. They, not the flag burners, demonstrators, and draft dodgers, nor the astronauts and POW's are the real heroes of our day. Those convicted are political prisoners. Those indicted are in the same fix. I urge you to get William Kuntsler, the ACLU, and the editors of *The New York Times* into the act as soon as possible. This is obviously just another instance of the brutish American people trying to impose their biased legal system upon visionaries and defenders of a higher virtue. Mobilize the forces of justice. Go to it — in no time you should have the whole affair so confused that the courts will not even be able to give Gordon Liddy, Jeb Magruder, or John Dean a parking ticket.

I suppose that I should add that I found this whole affair profoundly distasteful. When politicians wink at the laws they are supposed to make money, not lose money. Consider Democratic Congressman Dowdy or Democratic Senator Brewster. Consider Governor Kerner, or Judge Kerner if you prefer. And what of President Johnson's epigones Bobby Baker and Billie Sol Estes? The Republicans have a great deal to learn, and they might as well start by taking lessons from the Democrats. In the meanwhile, if you will send me a stamped, self-addressed envelope, I shall send you my pamphlet, *Politics and Untaxable Personal Gains*. I hope to hear from you soon wherever you might be.

—GWP

---

the problems go away. She acknowledges unequal opportunity and pay, and professional disincentives, and wraps up the subject by saying, "These are, however, issues of injustice that lend themselves not to the large-scale analyses of a liberation movement but to the particular and practical application of pressure against the wrongdoers."

Conversation with educated young women will probably reveal that they are concerned most with occupational problems, not just with discrimination but with the general ordeal of performance and advancement. Domestic arrangements with men are the second concern, but the difficulties are likely to be practical and the way of life is likely to vary only in details from a traditional household. Decter has refuted arguments that bear a limited relationship to the real problems of women, but apparently her purpose is to eliminate the overkill.

The mobilization of women to more diverse expectations now requires concrete steps to eliminate constraints. While unequal treatment exists, and while the overall economic condition of women is not on a par with men, perhaps the greatest constraint to success lies within women's personalities. Irresolute women, women afraid of upsetting a real or hoped-for domestic attachment, pass up opportunities or fail to create them. Growth is painful, and Women's Liberationists might, in addition to facilitating the practical arrangements necessary for expanded commitments, encourage the timid or uncertain woman to exercise her latent ambitions and drives.

Women's Liberationists have tended to pity this woman, to sneer at her, or to encourage her openly to disrupt the very relationships from which she derives strength. Without explicitly championing this woman, Decter has affirmed the value of the commitments Women's Liberation finds oppressive. She seems to think that a kick in the pants will do this woman more good than systematic bitching about female stereotypes.

Patricia Kavanagh

WEAVER
(continued from page 4)

who want to bring the Blob under control, their only remaining hope is to try to talk it into submission. What else can they do when all the usual weapons have proved useless?

This talk of how Watergate has already vindicated the System also serves the more personal interest of the various players. Certainly it is a useful rhetoric for the President, who, after months of denying any White House involvement in Watergate, has now told us that there was such involvement, but that he neither authorized nor knew of it. He has fired all those who were involved and ordered everyone to cooperate with the investigation; and he insists, I hope truthfully, on his own innocence. In this



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situation, he praises the System for two reasons. Most important, he wants to concede wrongdoing on the part of his aides and to encourage their prosecution, while at the same time discouraging further inquiry into, or speculation about, his own role. By praising the System, he suggests that the entire episode has now come to a close and that justice has been completely served. And second, he wants to denounce his aides and their actions while also dissociating himself from them. By describing Watergate as a triumph of the System, he suggests that they were alien to the System while he, by contrast, is the System's servant and defender.

Underlying the President's rhetoric is, of course, his determination to remain in office and to exonerate himself and his Administration. The motivations of Congress in all this are similar in some ways, but much more complex. On the whole Congress also prefers to keep the President in office and hopes not to have to consider the question of impeachment. There are many reasons for this position, some of them entirely honorable, others less so. As for these latter, there is, first of all, the fact that keeping Nixon in office for the next three years with his moral authority gravely impaired is a first-rate way of improving the chances that a Democrat will be elected President in 1976. By contrast, if the President were impeached, Mr. Agnew would become President — and for various reasons, not the least of them incumbency, his chances in 1976 could be very good. Second, there is the fact that at some point continued probing of Watergate is likely to implicate congressmen, either directly or as a result of counter-investigations launched from the Executive Branch. And third, there is the fact that, if it does come down to impeaching President Nixon, Congress would prefer this to be seen as an action taken by the System in behalf of the values and preservation of the System — not as a political act by political men. For all these reasons, Congress too has begun to praise the System. The only difference between the congressional and the presidential use of this rhetoric is that the President hopes that it will help to exonerate him, while Congress calculates that it will not.

One reason why Congress makes this latter forecast is that if the Watergate actions are described as alien to the System, then the mind-set that gave rise to Watergate can be attributed to Richard Nixon personally, who, after all, is the one who hired and promoted Haldeman, Erlichman, Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, and all the rest. That is, Nixon can be described as the underlying cause" of Watergate. The only alternative is to attribute Watergate to — the System itself Now it is true that Democratic congressmen are prepared to blame the System to some extent and for some purposes. In particular, they are happy to go along with the campaign-spending reformers, led by John Gardner, in attributing some of the blame in Watergate to campaign-spending laws. Clearly one of the likeliest legislative outcomes of Watergate is further reform of campaign finance — a long-time Democratic objective, inasmuch as Republicans generally have much more money than Democrats for presidential campaigns. But this aside, and for the most part, the Democrats would like to be able to attribute most of the blame for Watergate to Nixon himself, and not to the System. Therefore they redouble their praise of the System, so that for the next three years Nixon will stand as the man personally responsible for what happened, a political being who is alien to the System and who, together with his political heirs, ought to be rejected by the people at the next electoral opportunity.

The question, of course, is: Does Watergate really vindicate the System as thoroughly as everybody is claiming? Is all this talk of the System good political science, or is it more nearly in the category of science fiction? My own view is that it is a little of both, but that it contains much more science fiction thar. anyone has yet acknowledged. The Watergate story does vindicate the press to some extent, the investigative and prc secutorial systems to some extent, and the courts and grand juries to a very great extent. These institutions may work slowly, but they do work, and for that we may all be thankful. To be sure, political motivations were operating behind the scenes even in these institutions, but they cut in both directions (if the Justice Department was a bit slow and reluctant to come to the obvious conclusion, the press and Congress were, especially at first, a bit quick) and so cancelled each other out. In any event, politics cannot and probably should not be prevented from exercising a marginal influence over our public institutions. So in these respects, then, Watergate is indeed something to which we could point with a degree of justifiable pride.

Great American Series

When constituents begin asking politicians, "What have you *undone* for me lately?" the situation will improve.

— Edward C. Banfield

In several other crucial respects, however, the Watergate episode stands as an indictment of the System because, when properly understood, it must be seen as a pathological outgrowth of some of the most central characteristics of the System. I do not mean, of course, that Watergate is an expression of the alleged "rottenness" of American society as a whole — that's utter nonsense. Nor do I even have particular reference to the problems of campaign finance, though these are not trivial and do arise out of the public law and informal practices which define one particular sector of the System. These deserve close scrutiny and probably merit some kind of reform, but I am impressed by how independent of Watergate most of the Vesco-type abuses are. The Committee for the Re-election of the President could have had — for all I know it did have — millions upon millions of dollars of such dirty money and still not have done the deeds which we group under the rubric of Watergate — dirty tricks, the Ellsberg burglary, the White House coverup, and the rest. Reforming campaign finance — which will turn out to be much harder to do without creating new and equally serious defects than might at first glance seem — will almost certainly have little or no effect on the incidence of Watergate-type abuses in the future.

For Watergate was very much an outgrowth of our current system of presidential selection and of the entire character of presidential politics in the present age. This is not to say that this system *must* give rise to Watergates, or that Watergates are the only kind of pathology to which our method of presidential politics is prone; quite the contrary on both counts. But I do mean to say that Watergate bears a direct, organic, cause-and-effect relationship to our currect system of presidential politics, and that until we make this connection we shall not have fully comprehended precisely what Watergate means to us. The connection is not at all obscure; we have ignored it only because we are too caught up in our rhetorical strategies to see or acknowledge it.

Everyone has quite properly observed that Watergate would never have happened had the people around the President and in the CRP been authentic political professionals. Among other things, a pro knows that you don't bug the opposition, or commit other felonies, because the benefits are always small and the po-

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tential costs enormous. (For one thing, you could go to jail — which would mean that your life's work as a professional politician would be instantly and forever ended.) Only an amateur, one without political experience, one who does not make politics his career, one not socialized into the craft of politics, one defined not as a craftsman but as an ideologue or a courtier — only such a person could have undertaken Watergate. This much is widely acknowledged. What is not so widely acknowledged is the reason why Nixon was surrounded by amateurs in 1972. Some have explained it in terms of Nixon's personality, which is not entirely wrong, but which leaves unanswered a further and absolutely crucial question: if Nixon's personality is what accounts for his willingness to hire and rely on amateurs, then what is it that accounts for the fact that Nixon, with this personality and this preference, was able to successfully negotiate the cruel Darwinian gauntlet that is our presidential selection system? That system selects a very special sort of person with very special skills and characteristics; it ruthlessly weeds out all other kinds of people. Clearly it used to weed out amateurs and persons who relied on amateurs — Nixons, in short, on the above, only partly valid theory of Nixon's personality and skills. So why didn't it weed out Nixon in 1968 and 1972? Why did Nixon manage to make it all the way to the White House?

The answer goes to the very heart of the American political system, and to its greatest emerging slaw. Presidential politics are now almost entirely separate from the political party; or, to put it the other way around, our political party organizations have become weaker and weaker over the past decades, to the point where they exercise shockingly little influence over the selection of presidential candidates and presidents. The personal following and the amateur club have replaced the local party organization; the primary system has replaced the brokered nominating conventions; the jet plane, the fat cat, and the media specialists have replaced the traditional party-based election campaign. The result is that presidents don't have to be pros to be elected or even nominated; indeed, it helps their image in the media if they are amateurs. They don't need to be skilled in dealing with a variety of different local organizations and interests; they don't have to be in touch with all the different sectors of their party; and the result is that we end up selecting men for president who lack not only the skills of the pro, but also his habits and methods and preferences in aides. Such men have a tendency to turn the White House staff and the administration as a whole into a personal court where personal loyalty is the prime consideration. Such men are often isolated from contact with the various sectors of American society. Such men may find that this arrangement gives them maximum room for maneuvering, maximum time to think and study, and maximum opportunity to exert presidential power and presidential preferences over the bureaucracy. But as we have also seen, this arrangement also seems to create a maximum probability of Watergates.

Incidentally, Watergate-type behavior is not the only pathological consequence of our increasingly party-less presidential politics. Another pathology to which it is prone is the nomination of the unelectable candidate, as happened to the GOP in 1964 and to the Democrats in 1972. Yet a third pathology is the increasing lack of coherence in the parties of Congress, and indeed the growing budgetary irresponsibility of Congress. All these stem, in one way or another, from the same political source: the erosion, in some areas to the point of devastation, of the political party. This is not, of course, to say that all these pathologies are of equal magnitude; the Watergate variety is incomparably the most virulent. But what I do say is that Watergates are not the only price we pay for our current system of presidential selection and for its divorcement from an ever weaker two-party system.

Why this erosion of party has taken place is a long story, and nobody has yet told it all. Cultural changes seem an important part of the explanation, and so are certain developments in public law over the last seventy years. Clearly the press has also played a role in the weakening of political parties. It is hard to say what should be done to shore up this absolutely crucial political institution and to reintroduce its beneficent influences into our system of presidential parties, but it is clear that campaign finance reform won't even begin to do the whole job. So what we need to do now is to put aside the science fiction of our manipulative, self-aggrandizing rhetoric about Watergate as a Triumph of the System, and to turn instead to the task of developing a proper political science of Watergate. If we do that, and if we learn and act on its lessons, only then will there be a real possibility that this disgraceful episode will be transformed into an enduring triumph of the American democracy, and of the System which helps to define it. □

Myths of the Vietnam War

— The Pentagon Papers Reconsidered

by Robert F. Turner
in "Southeast Asian Perspectives"
Number 7 September, 1972

In an especially lucid moment several years ago, C.L. Sulzberger neatly sketched an essential impediment to American success in Vietnam. "The real objective of Revolutionary Warfare is to achieve victory on the main battlefield which is neither military nor in Vietnam but political and in the U.S." The North Vietnamese, Sulzberger reported, believe that their strategy is workable because "great powers engaged in small wars are more vulnerable at home than on the battlefield." This is so because the actions of "nondictatorial and democratic opponents . . . are governed by the majority opinion of a confused public."

The strategy and the confusion have been fueled in the United States by Hanoi's academic bagmen (as the British would put it) and assorted, native-grown muddleheads who have produced an Anti-Vietnam History Lesson and sold it as the standard text for media as well as college use.

Robert F. Turner, a Vietnamese affairs specialist on the staff of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, catalogues and examines this received wisdom under the rubric of *Myths of the Vietnam War*. First, he lays out the pieces of historical misinterpretation in all their detail and ingenuity: that the United States became involved in Vietnam to restore French colonialism; that the United States first broke the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and refused to allow free elections in 1956; that Ho Chi Minh was the "George Washington" of Vietnam; that the war was a struggle by the nationalist NLF to liberate and reunite their nation, which had a thousand-year tradition of unity; that American leaders utterly mistook the communism of the nationalist Vietnamese for the monolithic, expansionist communism of Lenin and Stalin; and on and on the myths run. (Is there a backwater in the country that has not had some leavings of this rendition floated upon it?) Then Turner's devastating analysis reveals it all for hokum, and clearly illuminates the myths as, in his words, "a collection of historical and factual inaccuracies and half-truths." Indeed, Turner's 55 p .s and 200 footnotes describe a case study of the muse of history being ravished. So much for academic integrity.

Take, for example, the claim that Ho Chi Minh was a popular or nationalist "George Washington." Who ever reminds us that after Ho left Vietnam at the age of twenty-one (in 1911), he effectively expatriated himself, that he became one of the founders and official representatives of the French Communist Party, helped originate the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 not as a Vietnamese

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delegate but as an official representative of the Communist International, and in fact did not again set foot on Vietnamese soil until 1941? The noncommunist, anti-French nationalist, Phan Boi Chau, whom Bernard Fall has called "Vietnam's Sun Yat-sen," Ho regarded as a rival. Ho later sold him out to the French. Indeed, throughout the 1930s and 1940s Ho eliminated thousands of noncommunist nationalist leaders, including members of the popular "Viet Nam Quoc Dang" party. Ho has been called the "Tito" of Vietnam, even though — ironically — Ho approved of Moscow's repudiation of Tito's independence. Did Ho, as a nationalist, reflect the Vietnamese people's innate distrust of China, as is so often claimed? Wrote Ho himself in a passage simultaneously approving Marx, Lenin, and Mao: "Vietnam and China are two brotherly countries, having close relations like 'lips and teeth.' "

Or consider for a moment the manifold myths of U.S. betrayal of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Anti-Vietnam History Lesson alleges of course that the United States encouraged Diem to ignore the elections and delay unification of Vietnam because it feared a landslide victory for Ho Chi Minh. Turner, in a long series of hard-hitting arguments, effectively destroys this view. He shows that the United States attended the Conference only as an observing "friendly nation," that it announced repeatedly that it would not support general elections in part supervised by the communists, that it signed only the Cease-Fire which but once in passing mentions "general elections" someday to be held, and that it deliberately refused to sign any of the more explicit documents regarding elections. Turner cites several historians who believe neither side seriously expected that the elections would be carried out, and he goes on to expose as mythology the "natural and historical unity" of both Vietnams. So who first violated the Agreements? The Americans, for not holding elections which would have been impossible to hold fairly anyway? Or the communists, for never withdrawing their forces from the South (in violation of Article 1) and forbidding hundreds of thousands of refugees, slaughtering many of them, from leaving the North (in direct defiance of Article 14)?

Not only are academicians at fault for the myths. There have been some willing rubes in journalism too. Witness this statement in the UPI's summary history of the Vietnam war, sent to subscribers last October: "But there was another reason for the decision not to hold the election (in 1956). As President Eisenhower was later to remark in his memoirs, every responsible observer estimated that Ho Chi Minh would have won if there had been an honest election." This, one of the great canards of the era, is the infamous "Eisenhower Quote," an intellectual ripoff of the first magnitude and the century's most publicized example of quoting out of context. In fact, as anyone with the honesty to do a bit of research could confirm, Eisenhower was referring to an entirely different election — one that would have taken place two years earlier (before the communist purges in the North) against a feeble opposition which did *not* include Diem.

The monograph is subtitled "The Pentagon Papers Reconsidered," and it is all the more interesting because those doughty documents, which we had all supposed supported the Anti-Vietnam History Lesson, are employed by Turner as one means to analyze the myths. Half of his references are to the Pentagon Papers and their cache of primary source material, and lead to his conclusion that they "thoroughly discredit most of the myths . . ."

Myths of The Vietnam War is a tight little piece of meaningful "revisionist" scholarship. For those who would like to see how it is done, copies are available cheapest from ISI, 14 S. Bryn Mawr Ave., Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010, at fifty cents each. Now that this war is receding into history let us hope that the critical minds which have examined American policy so rigorously will begin to review the academic and journalistic accounts of the war's origin. Turner's research is an auspicious beginning.

John F. Lulves

CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 2)

floods and tornados of the Mississippi Valley might be the consequence of government policy to discontinue atmospheric atomic testing. In Tennessee civil libertarians have yet to respond to the dubious judgment of Circuit Court Judge George R. Shepherd who, on April 21, ordered the faithful of a rural cathedral to stop handling poisonous snakes in their religious observances. Earlier in the month, two of the parishioners expired after guzzling strychnine during a solemn testimony of faith to which the spirits seem not to have been privy. Since that misfortune rumors have persisted to the effect that the area swarms with government agents, the representatives of several large foundations, and staff members from *National Geographic* magazine.

●Political prisoners were in the news. Mr. James Earl Ray was definitely denied a new trial. Mrs. Edith Irving began her two-year jail term in Switzerland, and harassment of her imprisoned husband, the controversial author, continued when authorities claimed they had found a pint of liquor on the distinguished author's person. Meanwhile the media are furiously stoking the furnaces, trying to heat up the American people to a febrile dither, in hopes that the people will accept the media's fantastic tale about Watergate. Eyes bulge and pulses pound as the reporters and gossips pile luridity atop luridity, all the time exaggerating the importance of what was perhaps little more than a lapse of campaign etiquette.

●Members of the Watergate Seven are now being implicated in a pedestrian attempt to burglarize the files of an obscure California psychiatrist. Grand jury investigations led by white ethnic, Judge John Sirica, and Senate hearings under the stewardship of Senator Sam Ervin, a Southern Bourbon, are

(continued on page 31)

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

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

One of the nicest things that has happened to me of late is a friend sending me a subscription to your thought-provoking and often hilarious **Alternative.**

A case in point is Tommy W. Rogers' "On Ms. Muffet" in the March issue, Vol. 6. I laughed until I cried and have read and reread it. I am now in the process of having many copies made to send to friends and relatives, as well as social workers (of certain ilk) and a few psychiatrists who become suspicious when you say "good morning." A GREAT MAGAZINE and best of luck.

Sincerely,
Mrs. Beavon Boeselager
Park Ridge, Illinois

To the Editor:

I recently overheard a conversation between two of the oddest chaps. One called himself Plunkitt; the other went by the name of G. Tilden Masque. Their language was atrocious and their ideas unremarkable; still, I thought you might be interested in hearing what they said.

Masque:

I am a senior citizen, a travel agent, and an American. I used to be patriotic and a Republican, but now I am hardly either. First inflation sapped my savings — much of which was salted away in U.S. Government Savings Bonds, series E—and then devaluation wrecked my travel business. After Roosevelt made holding gold bullion a crime, my father told me that I might as well speculate in Confederate greenbacks as buy government securities. Was he right and am I right in believing that the Republicans are out to get me? Also, is this the politics of genocide I've heard so much about?

Plunkitt:

While it is impossible for me to know how you might have offended the GOP, I can advise you to get out of both your savings bonds and the travel business. You are not the first man who should have listened more closely to his father. As to genocide, it is out of favor, largely because of the idealism of the New Left. Washington seems to have settled for a strategy of attrition in dealing with the nation's elderly.

To the best of my memory, this is what they said. While there is little here of any redeeming intellectual merit, Plunkitt seemed so fond of you that I thought I'd pass it along.

A correspondent
New York, N.Y.

To the Editor:

Recently one of the African students here stopped me to say how "great" the President was. Yes, it was President Nixon to whom he referred. And why did he think Nixon so "great." Was it a new move for integration? Was it a new aid program for developing nations? No! it was, in one word, Watergate.

My investigation reveals that, at least here, this is not an uncommon sentiment among students from the so-called Third World. Apparently, among them, the Watergate caper has enhanced the President's image.

This may be surprising, but I think it makes obvious certain feelings that the Westerners have only uneasily sensed in the cultures of the developing nations. At the risk of generalizing unduly from a limited sample, let me offer the following, which are I believe verifiable in the national political behaviors of the countries of the Third World.

1) Approval of the Watergate caper indicates several things: it indicates (a) approval of the self-seeking disregard of what passes for contemporary Western morality; (b) specific disapproval of the Western ideal of fair-play; (c) a general belief that Western moral ideals are altruistic nonsense; (d) a belief that those who have faith in such ideals are sanctimonious fools; and (e) a belief that advancement justifies any successful means to it.

2) As the only nation that "really" attempts moral posturing, it is consequently to be expected that the U.S. is frequently roundly condemned. (a) The people of the Third World want us to know that they see through our ruse and see us as being as selfish as everyone else. (b) No anti-Communist diatribes are necessary because of the obvious transparency of the Communists' attempts at moralizing. Russian imperialism in Europe and that of North Vietnam in Indo-China are quite blatant.

This gives us our last point: 3) With selfishness so obvious, respect is granted to those who, while pursuing their own ends vigorously, concoct the most ingenious excuses. At this game, and a game it is, the Communists get first-prize. They have a marvelous and even somewhat systematic ideology for explaining how their blatant imperialism is, in truth, the highest morality. And the ideology even manages to condemn those who relish things like independence and liberty. A superb stroke of rationalizing genius it is.

Therefore, the "untrustworthy schemer" in the White House, who is intolerable to the "right-minded people" and other liberals, is to the people of the Third World an unpretentious realist. As such he is accorded more respect than any other American president in a long time.

Yours sincerely,
Bruce E. Meyer
University of St. Andrews
Scotland

To the Editor:

As long as three years ago (when one of my fraternity brothers subscribed) I realized that **The Alternative** was one of the wittiest student magazines around. Now that you are running articles like Robert H. Ferrell's "Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View" it is becoming one of the most useful. I eagerly awaited your May issue so I could read the second installment and finish my term paper.

As I am about to graduate, let me thank you for providing me with entertaining and useful reading. Just one question: How can you stay in business when you charge only $3.00 a subscription?

William Lehrman
Columbus, Ohio

To the Editor:

Your book review section is getting better by leaps and bounds. Cooper's review of Fairlie's **The Kennedy Promise** — though I have not yet read the book (now I may not have to) — seems to me the best summary of Kennedy's effect on the presidency that anyone has ever managed to write. As for Goldberg's review of **Truman** and Ferrell's review of **The Rivals**: historical journals must be getting envious.

John Morgan
U.C. San Diego
LaJolla, California

To the Editor:

It is always with distrust and disdain that I read the letters published in journals. They are trite or inane, reflective of mindlessness, usually incoherent, sometimes even fraudulent. Who would think that I would ever be compelled to write one.

Nonetheless I wish to commend your journal for its intellectual yet realistic consideration of issues, both social and political, historical and contemporary. For a quasi-professional periodical, I sense a hard-working and dedicated staff.

In particular I wish to congratulate you for your April and May issues. Occasionally I pick up a history book and have become intrigued by the origins and development of the Cold War. The two-part article by Prof. Ferrell has at last given the revisionists the "dressing-down" they deserve. Those young punks are a disgrace to the profession. Their monocausal neuroses, sneaky and deceitful scholarship, and arrogance make me wonder just what type of graduate schools could have produced such monsters. Clearly they would be more adept at writing science fiction.

Also, a word on your book reviews—Wow! They have caused me to cancel my subscription to **The New York Review of Books.** Not only are reputable scholars such as Profs. Ferrell, Maddox, and Perkins an indication of **The Alternative's** intellectual sophistication, but it is reassuring to know that bright, young graduate students such as Cooper, Folsom, and Goldberg will, in time, replace the aging historians and offset the gruesome influence of the wretched, unscrupulous revisionists.

Ms. Deborah L. Berg
Chicago, Illinois

To the Editor:

In reading Gary North's article on "The Perseverance of the Family" in your February 1973 issue, I was bothered by one particular passage in which North implied that individualist-anarchist Murray Rothbard was an opponent of the family.

On the contrary, Rothbard has always been a defender of marriage and the family. Rothbard has on numerous occasions recommended these social institutions as the proper setting for a happy and moral life.

But Rothbard does, as North indicated, oppose "slave contracts." In other words, one can indeed decide to associate with someone (as a servant, disciple, husband, wife, or whatever) for a period of time (even for a lifetime, the period that Rothbard would suggest that marriages be intended for). But Rothbard argues, quite sensibly, that moral virtue is dependent upon acts of free will, and that enforcing through coercion an agreement to associate with someone is an attack on the necessary conditions for leading a moral life. Legally binding "slave contracts" would be an attempt to alienate the free will of a moral agent.

Where his life and liberty (usually in the form of his personal labor services) are at stake, an individual must be free to quit. If he can't quit, he is a slave.

Sincerely yours,
Williamson M. Evers
Stanford, California

To the Editor:

The advertisement your magazine published in the May 1973 issue Vol. 6, No. 8, on page 26, has to be a gag.

I do not believe that a magazine as sophisticated as **The Alternative** could possibly believe in Dr. Scott's electric girdle for men. The ad states that Dr. W.A. Hammond of New York was the late Surgeon General of the U.S., and I do not really remember that either.

Please tell me that the ad was a gag or I will think **The Alternative** has gone ape.

Respectfully,
G. Thomas Samartino, M.D.
(Orthopaedic Surgery)

Dear Dr. Samartino:

Fie! on Dr. Scott and his fraudulent designs. He has duped us and he is now on his way to New Jersey with the two hundred dollars Baron Von Kannon paid him for a Mid-west franchise. I expect his next stop will be at HEW. Incidentally, the girdle itself worked fine, but the cord was so short I could never leave the office.

R.E.T.

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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripides

Current Wisdom

WASTELAND REVISITED

Free form art practiced in the book review column of the sagacious Progressive:

Theodore Roszak is a seeker. Like many others in a land that has seemingly lost its soul, he wants to transcend alienation and live as a whole human being.

— *The Progressive*

THE NEW DEAL

Sally Quinn of The Washington Post relates one of the more tantalizing details stuffed into Elliott Roosevelt's new memoir of family life with Franklin and Eleanor:

Because of the termination of conjugal relations between the Roosevelts, Franklin was driven first to Lucy Mercer, who had started out as Eleanor's social secretary. Confronted with an offer of divorce from Eleanor when she learned the truth, and threatened with a financial cutoff by his mother and the ruination of a political career, Franklin gave up Lucy — only to find solace in the arms of another secretary, Marguerite "Missy" LeHand, who was with him from the time she was 20 until she died some 15 years later. Missy it is revealed, had an adjoining room to Franklin's, and often the children would enter to see Missy in their... **(the remainder of this exciting passage seems to have been deleted by one of the more puritanical typesetters at the Post, eds.)**

—*The Washington Post*

MYSTERIES OF THE EXOTIC ORIENT

Sound counsel averred to Illinois' Governor Daniel Walker by the enigmatic Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Esq. while the wise old mountebank awed the solons of that forward-leaning state, as reported in the celebrated Sun-Times of Chicago:

People who make budgets are nervous when there are problems in society. The basis of a restful budget is no problems in society. Struggle has been the history of life, but man doesn't have to struggle anymore. Our technique is one which enables man to make full use of his mental ability. This then, is the generation that does not have to continue to struggle.

—*The Chicago Sun-Times*

STILL MORE MYSTERY

The Chicago Sun-Times reveals what can happen even to a strongly self-respecting professional guru after he has come into contact with America's Madison Avenue. Listen to the numinous flutterings of the dollar bills:

I have a sublime plan for all mankind! I have the one piece of knowledge that can free mankind from problems and suffering.

— Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Inc.

POLITICAL ECONOMY PRACTICED HERE

Another Pecksniff from America's great lounging class yowls about the dreadful system that made him a millionaire:

I think (The Godfather) is about the corporate mind. In a way, the Mafia is the best example of capitalists we have. Don Corleone is just an ordinary American business magnate who is trying to do the best he can for the group he represents and for his family ... I think the tactics that the Don used aren't much different from those General Motors used against Ralph Nader.

— Dr. Marlon Brando

AN AMERICAN FAIRY TALE

An inspiring tale of the perilous state of freedom on America's campuses and of what some enlightened groups are doing to make America face up to herself or himself:

On many campuses, students who either profess to be homosexual or are suspected of being homosexual are often referred for psychiatric counseling. Spokesmen for a number of homosexual groups said they found this a vicious response, rooted in what they say is an antiquated morality.

The campus groups do counseling of their own — on such things as how to break the news of one's homosexuality to roommates and parents. Steve, an organizer of the group at Yale, said he waited for a year before letting his roommates know. Then he hung posters in his room advertising a homosexual dance and a roommate asked Steve if he belonged to the sponsoring group.

"I thought everything was settled until a few months later," he said, "when I discovered one roommate negotiated with the dean for a single room for me."

— *The New York Times*

THE ELEVATION OF THE WHINE

As controversy rages throughout the Republic over performance of the Star Spangled Banner at muscle extravaganzas, The New York Times interviews Mr. John Smith and a hush falls over the audience as Mr. Smith raises a puerile whine to the level of high-toned ideology. Rousseau is resurrected in a jock strap:

John Smith, University of California, Los Angeles, quarter-miler: "I don't think it should be played. For me, it creates a political atmosphere. Sports should be completely separate from politics. I would favor abolishing it at all sports events. A lot of athletes feel they are pressured into standing during the anthem. My preference is not to stand."

— *The New York Times*

HIGH BROWS

Astonishing testimony to the sad condition of racial amity in the land of the free by Mr. James Brown, artiste:

I have sold more records than Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms put together, but because of the racial problem in the United States, nobody emphasizes this."

— *The Indianapolis Star*

MEMOIRS OF A PARISIAN BEAUTY

The state of jurisprudence in post-Napoleonic France:

A man who didn't know that the woman he claimed to have slept with had an artificial navel was convicted of perjury today.

The man, Andre Loisel, testified in a divorce case three years ago that the unidentified woman was having extramarital relations. He claimed to have slept with her in a Paris hotel.

The woman denied this, and at Loisel's trial for perjury he neglected to mention that the woman had an artificial navel as a result of an operation some years earlier.

"Even in a room where the lights were low this detail could not have gone unnoticed," one of the judges ruled. Loisel received a suspended sentence of three months in jail and a $200 fine.

— *The Washington Post*

THE GOD THAT FAILED

Theological developments at the birthplace of the industrial revolution:

When production fell at a British sweater factory because the women on the staff became frightened by hearing footsteps in the corridors, the management hit upon a solution.

The archdeacon of Loughborough, the Rev. Harold Lockley, was called in to exorcise a 100-year-old ghost of the factory's founder that people say haunts the place.

— *The Miami Herald*

DOWN HOME METAPHYSICS

The swell-guy posturing of effete snob James Reston. Next time you are in town just stop by his office. Bring the whole gang and wager on how long it will take this hail fellow to call out the constabulary:

I guess my office is a creative mess. It's untidy, and it's full of history books and reference books and books of quotations. I have a strong feeling that a newspaper office should be an open-door joint where everyone can come in and shout about the latest stupidity in Washington and talk it over. If the doors are closed, it takes a lot of the fun out of newspapering, which I've always thought should be a kind of mutual-aid society.

— *Esquire*

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CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 28)

oppressing some of the more forward-looking members of the Nixon Administration. On the last day of the month President Nixon guillotined the only men who have yet had the courage to knife Vice President Spiro T. Agnew in the back: Assistant President John D. Erlichman, H. R. Haldeman, and young John Dean III. Later in the evening he addressed the American people on the possibility of some impropriety stemming from the Watergate incursion and took full responsibility. Meanwhile, Mr. Herschel Boon of Bean Blossom, Indiana won the Perry County Lying Contest, despite stiff competition from a national field, and George McGovern revealed something of the grandeur of politics as practiced in America when he told the distinguished interviewer, Joe McGinniss, that since the election I've got to keep taking her (Mrs. McGovern) out to dinner and getting her loaded all the time in order to get her mind off it." — so ennobling is the American political experience.

●Earlier in the month U.S. Appeals Court Judge Otto Kerner, the eponym of the famed Kerner Report, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $50,000 for bribery, perjury, conspiracy, mail fraud, and tax evasion. Senator William Proxmire was nabbed *flagrante delicto* trying to include a $2,758 "medical deduction" in his 1973 tax return, based on the costs of his recent hair transplant. He filed an "amended return." Partisan newspaper reporters have tried to drag the name of Assistant President, John Erlichman, into the Ellsberg hearings which have been following an anfractuous legal high jinks in San Francisco. One source of the commotion is the wife of one of the defendants, Mrs. Anthony Russo, who is given to peddling organic food sandwiches to the defense staff and to spectators. After asking the President to withdraw his name from nomination as F.B.I. Director on April 5, Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III resigned under a little gray cloud on April 27. His place will be taken by William Ruckelhaus who has been heading the President's attempts to clean up the environment.

●In other news, Pablo Picasso's heart misfired. Sam (Roman Nose) DeStafano, the controversial businessman, was the victim of an anonymous shotgun blast while puttering in his garage. And the renowned law enforcement agent, Eugene (Bull) Connors, died in Birmingham, Alabama. Detroit police have become edgy about a veritable plague of motorized bordellos, which tour through the suburbs of that municipality. And a three judge federal panel in Philadelphia has ruled that the right to buy alcohol is not a "fundamental right" guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. President Nixon released a report indicating a decline in serious crime in 1972, but on the very day the report was released, James N. Allen of Washington, D.C. was admitted to a local hospital for treatment of second-degree burns, which he suffered when a woman assaulted him with a bowl of hot spaghetti as he slept in his apartment. There have been no arrests.

● On the foreign front Britain's National Health Service has decided to tax chastity belts. The Cambodian Government has arrested about fifty-five astrologers who consistently have reported bad omens to Marshall Lon Nol. Argentina issued a formal remonstrance to Brazil because the Argentine ambassador was delivered the Itaipu Dam Message by a Brazilian diplomat carelessly attired in swimming trunks. Brazil has denied the charges. And while thousands of Americans were roosting in baseball parks to watch season openers, thousands of Ugandans turned out in urban centers across the country to watch the first public executions of the season. Finally back in the United States the editors at many leading American publishing houses are feverishly laying plans to publish entirely new American government textbooks consistent with the recent findings of various grand juries, Senate investigating committees, Washington gossips, and other assorted researchers. □

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

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